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REPOSE OR NOT? INFORMAL OBJECTIONS
TO CLAIMS OF EXEMPTIONS
AFTER TAYLOR V. FREELAND
KENNETH DECOuRcY FERGUSON*
L Introduction
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,' over the untimely objection of the bankruptcy
trustee, the United States Supreme Court permitted the bankruptcy debtor to
exempt $110,000 that was ineligible for exemption under substantive exemption
law. The Court rejected the view that unless the debtor had a good faith claim to
the exemption or had a statutory basis for the exemption, even an untimely
objection to the debtor's claim of exemption could terminate the debtor's right to
the exemption.2 Disturbed by the prospects of debtors receiving unjustified
windfalls, several courts (before and after the Taylor decision) have developed
"informal objection" doctrines to circumvent the "strict constructionist" doctrine
the Court followed in Taylor. However, Taylor's potential for encouraging debtors
to file fictitious exemption claims in the hope that no timely objection would be
filed may be overstated.3 Both civil and criminal liability may deter debtors who
file fictitious exemptions, even those who successfully obtain a Taylor
exemption.4
While Taylor established that a late objection is ineffective, it did not consider
issues concerning the nature of the objection the trustee must file to avoid debtors
obtaining "exemptions by declaration." In particular, the decision did not consider
whether the trustee must present a formal objection to the bankruptcy court
within the time period prescribed by Rule 4003(b).6 Nor did the Court consider
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1. 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
2. See id. at 644.
3. The trustee in Taylor strenuously argued that rejection of his argument, that the debtor must have
a good faith claim to an exemption before the limitation period for filing objections by the trustee
expired, would encourage debtors to engage in the practice of "exemption by declaration." Id.
4. See generally Kenneth D. Ferguson, Discourse and Discharge: Linguistic Analysis and Abuse of
the "Exemption by Declaration" Process in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.. 55 (Winter 1996).
5. Since both the bankruptcy trustee and creditors have standing to contest a claim of exemption,
throughout the article the word "trustee" will be used as a proxy for both.
6. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) establishes the time period for objecting to the debtor's list of
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whether a formal objection, filed after expiration of Rule 4003(b)'s deadline,
could be considered timely upon application of the "relation back" doctrine or
some other theory.
This article will argue that 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) is more in the nature of a statute
of repose rather than a statute of limitation. One notable characteristic of a statute
of repose is that upon expiration of the repose period, the cause of action created
by the statute terminates. Therefore, the trustee's right to object to the debtor's
claim of exemption under section 522(1) terminates upon expiration of the
objection period established by Rule 4003(b). However, the fact that section
522(1) is a functional statute of repose does not affect application of "informal
objection" and "relation back" doctrines to cases where, before expiration of the
repose period of Rule 4003(b), the trustee files an informal objection to the
debtor's claim of exemption. If the informal objection is properly "filed," as that
term is defined by Rule 5005,' filing occurred before expiration of the thirty-day
period for objecting, and the informal objection adequately apprised the debtor of
the dispute surrounding the claim of exemption, the trustee's objection rights vest.
Once the trustee's objection rights vest, filing of a formal objection after
expiration of the repose period under Rule 4003(b) is effective whether you
consider the formal objection an amendment to the original informal objection
under the relation back doctrine or whether the foundations for vesting of the
trustee's objection rights is based on the informal objection alone.
I. Exempting Property from the Bankruptcy Estate
The primary respDnsibilities of the Chapter 7 trustee are to collect the debtor's
nonexempt properly, liquidate it, and pay out the proceeds8 according to the
Code's distribution scheme.9 The ability of the bankruptcy debtor to exempt
property from this process is crucial to the debtor achieving a "fresh start."'0
exemptions. In relevant part it provides:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt
within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule
2003(a) or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless,
within such periol, further time is granted by the Court.
Id. See FaD. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a) (requiring that the meeting of creditors in a Chapter 7 case shall be
called by the United States trustee "no fewer than 20 and no more than 40 days after the order for
relief').
7. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994).
10. In re Carilli, 65 B.R. 280, 282 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("A perusal of the legislative history
reveals that Congress intanded § 522 to provide the debtor with the essentials necessary for a 'fresh
start.'"); In re Mitchell, 80 B.R. 372, 376 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) ("In a very real sense, it might be said
that there are two independent schemes for assisting the debtor in achieving his fresh start vis-a-vis
exemptions. The first, typified by Section 522(1), is aimed principally at freeing select assets from the
general creditor body. The second, more restricted in scope and typified by Section 522(0, aims at
liberating certain assets from certain kinds of secured creditors."); In re Montgomery, 80 B.R. 385, 389
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) ("Section 522(1) serves an entirely different function, that of promptly liberating
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Obtaining the "fresh start" that bankruptcy offers is not cost free. The debtor
loses exclusive control of and power to direct the utilization of nonexempt
property." The debtor in a Chapter 7 case must surrender all nonexempt
unsecured property to the trustee for liquidation and distribution to creditors.'2
The procedure for exempting property is substantially different under the
current Bankruptcy Code than under the prior Bankruptcy Act.'3 Under the Act,
if the debtor claimed property as exempt, the trustee was required to "set apart the
bankruptcy's exemptions... and report the items and estimated value thereof to
the courts . ,.4""' If the debtor or other interested parties disagreed with the
trustee's valuation, they had the burden of objecting to the trustee's report.'5
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the requirement of a trustee's report is eliminated.'6
The property the debtor claims as exempt automatically becomes exempt if no
one objects.'7 It is the debtor's responsibility under the Code to initiate the
exemption process by filing a list with the bankruptcy court of the property
property the debtor wishes to keep for his "fresh start" from the continuing administration of the
bankruptcy court."); Boon v. Miner (In re Boon), 108 B.R. 697,700 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) ("Under the
Code, 'all property of the debtor, even property necessary for a fresh start, is included in the estate...
[a]fter the property comes into the estate, the debtor is then permitted to exempt property needed for a
fresh start."') (quoting Samore v. Graham (In re Graham)), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984)).
11. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1057 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In a
liquidation case, the debtor must surrender his nonexempt assets for liquidation and sale by the trustee."),
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 758 (1997); In re Duda, 182 B.R. 662, 667 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) ("While
it is true that the automatic stay prohibits unsecured creditors from proceeding to obtain judicial liens
against estate property, see § 362(a)(4), (c)(1), the quid pro quo for the stay is that all of the debtors'
nonexempt property will be distributed to those unsecured creditors who hold claims which could have
been satisfied from that property but for the commencement of the case.").
12. See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1057.
13. See Bankruptcy Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 47(a)(ii), 30 Stat. 544, 557, repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of Nov. 6, 1978, ch. 5, § 522(1), 92 Stat. 2586.
14. See Bankruptcy Act of June 1, 1898, § 47(a)(ii), 30 Stat. at 557, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, § 92, 92 Stat. at 2588.
15. FED. R. BANKR. P. 403 provides in relevant part:
a) CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS A bankrupt shall claim his exemptions in the schedule of
his property required to be filed by Rule 108. (b) TRUSTEE'S REPORT The trustee shall
examine the bankrupts claim for exemptions, set apart such as are lawfully claimed and
allowable, and report to the court the items set apart, the amount or estimated value of
each, and the exemptions claimed that are not allowable. The report shall be filed with
the court not later than 15 days after the trustee qualifies. If the trustee reports that any
exemption claimed is not allowable, he shall forthwith mail or deliver copies of the report
to the bankrupt and his attorney. (c) OBJECTIONS TO REPORT. Any creditor or the
bankrupt may file objections to the report within 15 days after its filing, unless further
time is granted by the court within such 15-day period. Copies of the objections so filed
shall be delivered or mailed to the trustee and, if the objections are by a creditor, to the
bankrupt and his attorney. After hearing upon notice the court shall determine the issues
presented by the objections. The burden of proof shall be on the objector.
Id.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994).
17. See id; see also Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).
1997]
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claimed as exempt." : In contrast to the exemption process under the Bankruptcy
Act, under the Bankruptcy Code, it is the trustee's burden to establish that the
debtor is not entitled to the exemptions claimed. 9
Although section 522(l) establishes the debtor's affirmative duty to file a list
of property claimed as exempt, it is Rule 4003(a) that details the substance of that
duty.' Under Rule 4003(a), Schedule C, the list of property the debtor claims
as exempt is included as part of the schedule of assets which must be filed with
the bankruptcy petition.2' In Schedule C, the debtor declares, under penalty of
perjury,' what property is claimed as exempt, the statutory authority for the
exemption, and the exempt property's value.'
Rather than requiring the trustee to file a report identifying exempt property,
the Code imposes a substitute duty to object to the property the debtor claims as
exempt.' The deadline for objecting to a claim of exemption is prescribed by
Rule 4003(b) as thirty days after the conclusion of the first meeting of
creditors. ' By its terms, Rule 4003(b) prohibits retroactive extension of its
deadline.' In the abSence of a timely objection, the property listed by the debtor
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (1994).
19. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(c) provides: "BURDEN OF PROOF. In any hearing under this rule,
the objecting party has the burden of proving that the exemptions are not properly claimed. After hearing
on notice, the court shall determine the issues presented by the objections."
20. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a). The Rule provides, in relevant part:
A debtor shall list the property claimed as exempt under § 522 of the Code on the
schedule of assets required to be filed by Rule 1007. If the debtor fails to claim
exemptions or file the schedule within the time specified in Rule 1007, a dependent of the
debtor may file the list within 30 days thereafter.
Id.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) specifies the documents which the debtor must file when commencing a
bankruptcy case. These documents include "a list of creditors ... a schedule of assets and liabilities, a
schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtors financial affairs."
Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007 designates precisely what documents are to filed for a bankruptcy case filed
under each chapter of the Code. The Rule also specifies when each of these documents are to be filed.
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008 states that "[a]ll petitions, lists, schedules, statements and amendments
thereto shall be verified o, contain an unswom declaration as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1746."
23. Official Form 6, Schedule C ("Property Claimed as Exempt").
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994).
25. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) prescribes the time for objecting to the debtor's exemptions. The
Rule provides, in relevant part:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt
within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule
2003(a) or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless,
within such period, further time is granted by the court.
Id.
26. Id.; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3) (forbidding retroactive enlargements of time under
Rule 4003(b) except as otherwise provided in Rule 4003(b)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a) (the meeting
of creditors in a Chapter 7 case shall be called by the United States trustee "no fewer than 20 and no
more than 40 days after the order for relief'); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e) (meetings of Creditors may
be adjourned from time to time, and are often continued, when there is unfinished business); In re
Havanec, 175 B.R. 920, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (an adjourned meeting of creditors is not
considered a concluded meting for the purposes of measuring the start of the 30-day period for objecting
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on Schedule C is exempt, regardless of whether the property qualifies for
exemption under applicable law,27 and regardless of whether the amount claimed
as exempt exceeds the amount permitted by applicable law.' This was the
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor.
A. The Taylor Decision and the Strict Constructionist Doctrine
The Supreme Court in Taylor rejected the trustee's attempt to incorporate
implicit conditions into section 522(l) to avoid the consequences of his failure to
file a timely objection to the debtor's claim of exemption. The debtor in Taylor
claimed an exemption for the proceeds of her discrimination lawsuit against her
employer. The value of the exemption was scheduled as unknown; however, the
debtor asserted that the full amount of any recovery was exempt.' The trustee
never filed an objection to the debtor's exemption claim and did not claim an
interest in this lawsuit until after it was settled for $110,000. The debtor
contended that the trustee's failure to timely file his objection barred any
recovery.
The trustee argued that the purpose of section 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) was not
to preclude judicial inquiry into the claimed exemption after expiration of the
objection period, but to narrow the scope of judicial review.3" Regardless of the
timeliness of the objection, the trustee argued that unless the debtor makes a good
faith claim to an exemption, the Court was not precluded from denying the
exemption claimed.32 The trustee's position had been followed by several
courts.33 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor, courts disagreed over
whether section 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) barred the trustee's untimely filed
objection.' Three different analytical views were adopted in construing section
to the debtor's claims of exemptions).
27. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 640.
30. See id. at 641.
31. See id. at 643.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Some courts held the debtor's claim of exemption was granted under § 522(1) only if there was
a good faith statutory basis for the exemption. See, e.g., Halverson v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 920 F.2d
1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1990); Munoz v. Dembs (Matter of Dembs), 757 F.2d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1985); In
re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993, 1002 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990). Other courts granted the exemption if the
exemption was valid. See, e.g., Stutterheim v. First State Bank (In re Stutterheim), 109 B.R. 1010, 1013
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); In re Staniforth, 116 B.R. 127, 130-31 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); In re Velis, 109
B.R. 64, 65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989), affd, 123 B.R. 497 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd in part & rev'd in part sub
nom. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Bennett, 36 B.R. 893, 894-95 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1984). Still other courts strictly construed § 522(1), holding that the exemption is granted if no timely
objection is filed. See, e.g., Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 423 (3rd. 1991); In re Bradlow,
119 B.R. 330, 331 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Duncan, 107 B.R. 754,756 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988);
Doyle v. Grossman (In re Grossman), 80 B.R. 311, 312-13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (citing earlier
bankruptcy courts decisions reaching the same result); In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1987); In re Hahn, 60 B.R. 69, 72-73 (Bankr. E.D. Minn. 1986); Kretzer v. DFW Federal Credit Union
1997]
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522() and Rule 4003(b)." Under the first view, referred to here as the "strict
constructionist" view, courts gave no consideration to the merits of the claimed
exemption. 6 According to these courts, the only concern was whether the
objection was timely filed. If the objection was not filed within the limitations
period of Rule 4003(b), the exemption was granted as claimed. 7
Fearing that application of the "strict constructionist" view would encourage
wholesale exemption declarations by debtors," some courts adopted the "implied
statutory basis" view, requiring some statutory basis for the claimed exemption. 9
If there was not a statutory basis for the claimed exemption, the trustee would be
allowed to object even after expiration of the limitations period.4' A literal
interpretation, these courts argued, would be an incentive to declare nonexistent
exemptions with the hope that no one would object.4
Some courts adopted an analytical approach that was a middle ground between
the strict constructionist and implied statutory basis theories. This third theory,
the "good faith" view, required a determination by the court of whether there was
a "good faith statutory basis" for the claimed exemption.42 Unless a good faith
statutory basis existed for the exemption, the debtor would not be shielded by
section 522(1). The trustee, therefore, could file an objection after the time for
filing has expired. The policy which justified the good faith requirement was that
of avoiding an "undeserved windfall" to the debtor, which a literal construction
of section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) would create.43
Without much fanfare, the Supreme Court rejected both the implied statutory
basis and the good faith theories. According to the Court, by negative implication,
Rule 4003(b) indicates that without first extending the time period, trustees simply
may not object to the claimed exemption after the thirty-day objection period."
(In re Kretzer), 48 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); In re Wiesner, 39 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1984); In re Gullickson, 39 B.R. 922, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
35. See Taylor, 938 F,2d at 423.
36. See Taylor, 938 F2d at 423; Bradlow, 119 B.R. at 331; Duncan, 107 B.R. at 756; Grossman,
80 B.R. at 312-13 (citing earlier bankruptcy courts decisions reaching the same result); Payton, 73 B.R.
at 33; Hahn, 60 B.R. at 72-73; Kretzer, 48 B.R. at 587; Wiesner, 39 B.R. at 965; Gullickson, 39 B.R.
at 923.
37. See Taylor, 938 F.2d at 423 (citing In re Bardlow, 119 B.R. 330 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Duncan, 107 B.R. 754 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988); Doyle v. Grossman (In re Grossman), 80 B.R. 311
(Bankr. E.d. Pa. 1987); In re Payton, 73 B.R. 31 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987)).
38. See In re Bennett, 36 B.R. 893, 895 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
39. See In re Stutterhcim, 109 B.R. 1010, 1013 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); In re Staniforth, 116 B.R.
127, 130-31 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990); In re Velis, 109 B.R. 64,65 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989), affd, 123 B.R.
497 (D.N.J. 1991), affid in part & rev'd in part sub nom Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991);
In re Bennett, 36 B.R. 893, 894-95 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984); In re Hensen, 101 B.R. 33, 34-36 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1988); In re Dembs, 757 F.2d. 777, 780 (6th Cir. 1985).
40. See Taylor, 938 F.2d at 423.
41. See In re Bennett, 36 B.R. at 895; Taylor, 938 F.2d at 426.
42. See In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Dembs, 757 F.2d 777, 780 (6th
Cir. 1985); In re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993, 1002 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990).
43. See Taylor, 938 F.2d. at 425-26; Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1393.
44. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992).
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The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit's position that the literal
construction advances the strong policy goals of finality" and certainty"
reflected by Bankruptcy Rules.
The need for finality and certainty is particularly acute in bankruptcy.47 In the
case of exemptions declared by the debtor in the bankruptcy schedules, final
determination of the debtor's entitlement to the exemption claimed is made by the
court following a timely filed objection, or, if no objection is timely filed, by the
default rules established by section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b)4 After expiration
of the time for filing objections, debtors can be assured that actions which they
take with respect to their property will not be questioned for an indeterminate
period of time in the future.4 ' According to the court, "Deadlines may lead to
unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality."
50
The Taylor decision did not consider the nature of the objection which the
trustee must file to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4003(b). In particular, does
Rule 4003(b) authorize an informal objection, or must the trustee file a formal
document denominated "Objection to Exemption?" Does Taylor's strict construc-
tionist doctrine prohibit reliance on informal objection doctrines? These issues
will be the considered in the analysis which follows.
B. Current Doctrinal Approaches to Untimely Filed Objections: Informal
Objection Doctrines
Section 522(1) of the Code provides that property the debtor claims as exempt is
exempt if an objection is not timely filed!'1 The Supreme Court's decision in
45. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644 ("Deadlines may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt
parties to act and they produce finality."); see also In re Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1993) ("It
would be inconsistent with Taylor's emphasis on finality to allow objecting parties to raise the issue
of the debtors' actual notice of opposition to claimed exemptions after the 30-day period has run.");
Redfield v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (In re Robertson), 105 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. ND. Ill.
1989); In re Kjerstad, 56 B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984) ("There is no finality for a debtor who
has not been served with an objection, notwithstanding the fact that the objection is filed with the Clerk
of the Bankruptcy Court .... [P]rejudice to the debtor will be presumed when considered in the light
of the applicable rules and the policy of finality behind them.").
46. See Taylor, 938 F.2d at 424. The Supreme Court's decision in Taylor only identified finality as
the policy the decision advances; however, the decision does not preclude certainty as a second policy
goal of Rule 4003(b).
47. See id. at 425 ("This need is reflected by Bankruptcy Rule 9006, which states that '[i]n the
interest of prompt administration of bankruptcy cases certain time periods may not be extended.' (citation
omitted) Thus, where there is a date when the parties' rights can be finally determined - in this case,
thirty days after the creditors' meeting if no objection is filed - the parties can proceed from that date
knowing which property is property of the estate and which property belongs to the debtor."); In re
Towns, 74 B.R. 563, 567 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, 1987); In re Grethan, 14 B.R. 221,225 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa,
1981); In re Van Pelt, 83 B.R. 617, 619 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa, 1987).
48. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 643.
49. See Taylor, 938 F.2d at 425 ("The debtor from that day forward can treat exempted property
as his or her own and is not forced to wait until some unknown future date when the trustee or another
party in interest might haul the debtor into court seeking that property.").
50. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644.
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994).
1997]
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Taylor precludes bankruptcy courts from conditioning exemptions on the debtor
having a good faith claim to the exemptions or a valid statutory basis for the
exemptions.' Courts were legitimately concerned that a literal application of
section 522(1) would lead to a proliferation of the "exemption by declaration"
phenomenon. The Taylor court recognized this concern, but pointed to alternative
remedies available to the bankruptcy court to discourage proliferation of the
"exemption by declaration" phenomenon However, the possibility that criminal
or civil penalties may result from claiming fictitious exemptions would discourage
this conduct by debtors and their attorneys?'
Many courts have taken more of an indirect approach to curbing proliferation of
the "exemption by declaration" phenomenon. Rather than excusing the trustee's
failure to timely object to a debtor's claim of exemptions, these courts have relied
on informal objection doctrines to hold that the trustee has satisfied her obligation
to timely object under Rule 4003(b). Other courts, however, reject these informal
objection theories, holding that Taylor precludes reliance on such doctrines. Each
of the informal objection doctrines, along with the strict constructionist doctrine
applied in Taylor, will be examined in the materials that follow.
1. The Surrogate Objection Doctrine
The informal objection doctrine that evolved55 from the "surrogate objection"
doctrine and culminated with the "relation back" doctrine had its genesis in two
analogous lines of cases. These cases have one factual similarity, a formal objection
to claimed exemptions was not filed by the trustee. Under the first line of cases,
courts generally avoided the consequence of the trustee's failure to file an objection
by declaring that a pleading filed before expiration of the deadline constituted a
"surrogate objection," thus abolishing the need for a formal objection.? These
52. See Taylor, 503 U S. at 643. In response to the Trustee's argument that "courts may invalidate
a claimed exemption after expiration of the 30-day period if the debtor did not have a good-faith or
reasonably disputable basis for claiming it", the Supreme Court stated: "We reject Taylor's argument."
Id.
53. Id. at 644. The Court stated that "[d]ebtors and their attorneys face penalties under various
provisions for engaging in improper conduct in bankruptcy proceedings." Id.; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §
727(a)(4)(B) (1994) (authorizing denial of discharge for presenting fraudulent claims); RULE 1008
(requiring filings to "be verified or contain an unsworn declaration" of truthfulness under penalty of
perjury); RULE 9011 (authorizing sanctions for signing certain documents not "well grounded in fact
and... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law"); 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1996) (imposing criminal penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases).
These provisions may limit bad-faith claims of exemptions by debtors.
54. See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 61-93.
55. The analysis of the application of the relation back doctrine in this context, much like Darwin's
theory of evolution, is an analytical construct. Therefore, the date a case is decided is not crucial to
charting the evolution of this doctrine. The decision's date, like fossil remains scientists discover and
utilize in constructing the evolution theory, may be a snapshot in time that displays the evolutionary
process, rather than the fully evolved doctrine.
56. See Liberty State Bank and Trust v. Grosslight (In re Grosslight), 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th Cir.
1985) (treating an adversary proceeding as an objection to the debtor's claim of exemption); In re Dembs,
757 F.2d 777,780-81 (6th Cir. 1985) (treating complaint as objection, but denying the objection because
[Vol. 50:45
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courts concluded that the surrogate objection filed by the trustee within the
limitations period of Rule 4003(b) comprised the objection to the debtor's claim of
exemptions.
Two Sixth Circuit decisions, both decided the same day, illustrate this doctrine.
In Matter of Dembs,58 a creditor brought an adversary action to satisfy a state court
judgment out of the Dembs' entireties property three months after the debtors'
Chapter 7 discharge was granted. In framing the issue, the Sixth Circuit implicitly
determined that the creditors' adversary complaint constituted a surrogate
objection." The court stated that "if the plaintiffs complaint is taken as a timely
objection to the claim of exemption, the objection may well be valid."' The court
concluded that the issue before it was therefore "whether the complaint was
timely."'" Timeliness of the complaint is relevant in the context of Rule 4003(b)
only if the complaint can constitute an objection.
Because neither Rule 4003 nor its precursor, Rule 403, applied, the Dembs court
resolved the timeliness issue by concluding "[tjhere was thus no time limit imposed
by rule on the creditor's objection to the claimed exemption";' therefore, the
complaint had to satisfy grounds for revocation of discharge under 11 U.S.C. §
727(b).' The court concluded that no such grounds were demonstrated. The
significance of Dembs was the court's determination that the complaint filed by the
creditor constituted a surrogate objection.
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in In re Grosslight.M In
Grosslight, Liberty State Bank & Trust instituted an adversary proceeding twenty-
it was filed post-discharge); Young v. Adler (In re Young), 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987)
(trustee's motion requesting all future annuity payments be turned over to the trustee was effective as an
objection, relying, however on notice-based doctrine); In re Stains, 52 B.R. 405, 411 (S.D. Tex. 1985)
(filing motion for relief from the automatic stay was sufficient to bring the issue before the court in a
timely manner with sufficient notice to interested parties, however, relying on notice-based doctrine);
Applebee v. Brawn (In re Brawn), 138 B.R. 327, 333 n.29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) ("Plaintiffs' response
to Hayward's § 522(0 motion qualifies, in and of itself, as the 'objection' Rule 4003(b) requires.").
57. See Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777; Dembs, 757 F.2d at 779; Young, 806 F.2d at 1305; Brawn, 138
B.R. at 333 n.29.
58. 757 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1985).
59. See id. at 779.
60. Id. at 779.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 781. According to the Dembs' court:
The question here, however, is whether Rule 4003 had taken effect on May 31, 1983,
the date plaintiff first sought to reach the entireties property in this case. The Supreme
Court transmitted these rules to Congress on April 25, 1983. They took effect on August
1, 1983, and are applicable to proceedings pending on that date, except to the extent that
in the opinion of the court their application in a pending proceeding would not be feasible
or would work injustice. This case was still pending on August 1, 1983, but we do not
think the rules can be applied retroactively to actions already taken by the parties, for they
were without notice that a restrictive rule might be applied."
Id. at 780.
63. See id. at 781. Section 727 is the discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Code. A Chapter 7
debtor is granted discharge unless the debtor has engaged in any number of ten offenses.
64. 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).
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four days after the debtors, Terry and Sandra Grosslight, filed bankruptcy. The
Grosslights were both signatories on a promissory note in favor of the Bank. The
debtors filed bankruptcy approximately one year after the bank instituted a civil
action in state court to enforce their liability on the promissory note. Rather than
filing an objection to the Grosslights' claim that their entireties property was exempt,
Liberty filed an adversary proceeding seeking relief from the automatic stay to
allow it to proceed with its state court action.' Liberty wished to reach the
Grosslights' entireties property by this procedure.
Relying on its decision in Dembs, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it would "treat this
adversary proceeding as an objection to the claim of exemptions."' In reaching this
conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that although the bank did not satisfy the
letter of the procedure set forth in Rule 4003(b), the court was "satisfied that
[Liberty's] failure to do so resulted from an excusable uncertainty as to the proper
procedure and that its filing did meet procedural concerns."'
In addition to the Sixth Circuit's decisions recognizing that motions for relief
from the automatic stay' and adversary complaints' are surrogate objections,
other courts have added to the litany of pleadings that qualify as surrogate
objections.7" The essential element of the surrogate objection doctrine is that the
trustee file a pleading within the limitations period of Rule 4003(b) raising the basis
for the trustee's objection to the debtor's exemption claim.7' However, for courts
following the "notice-based" doctrine (covered in the following section), the
surrogate objection must also place the debtor on notice that the trustee objects to
or disputes her exemption claim.
2. Notice-Based Doctrine
In the second line of cases in the doctrinal evolution of the informal objection
theory, as in the first line of cases discussed above, the trustee generally never filed
an objection to the debtor's claim of exemption. The analytical approach taken by
these courts in determining whether Rule 4003(b) is satisfied is referred to as the
"notice-based" doctrine. In terms of what constitutes an informal objection, the
notice-based theory is more liberal than the surrogate objection theory.n The
65. See id at 774.
66. Id. at 777.
67. Id But see In re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (disagreeing with the
Sixth Circuit's ruling in Grosslight).
68. See Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777.
69. See Dembs, 757 F.2d at 779.
70. See In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987) (trustee's motion requesting all future
annuity payments be turned over to the trustee was effective as an objection, but relying on notice based
analysis); In re Brawn, 138 B.R. 327, 333 n.29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) ("Plaintiffs' response to Hayward's
§ 522(f) motion qualifies, in and of itself, as the 'objection' Rule 4003(b) requires.").
71. See Dembs, 757 F.2d at 780; Grosslight, 757 F.2d at 777; Young, 806 F.2d at 1305 (trustee's
motion requesting all future annuity payments be turned over to the trustee was effective as an objection,
but relying on notice based analysis); Brawn, 138 B.R. at 333 n.29.
72. See In re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa. 1990) (stating that the Young "decision
is too liberal in its reading of what constitutes an objection to exemptions.").
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court's determination that Rule 4003(b) "establishes a notice procedure to alert the
debtors that the property claimed ,as exempt cannot be so treated until the
controversy surrounding its status is resolved,"' or that its purpose is to provide
the debtor notice that her exemption claim is disputed,74 is crucial to application
of the notice-based theory. The critical element of this theory is that the debtor
receive actual notice that the trustee disputes the exemption claim within the
limitations period of Rule 4003(b).
In In re Earnest,75 the debtors claimed that proceeds of the sale of their
homestead were exempt.76 The trustee notified the debtors shortly after commen-
cement of the Chapter 7 proceeding of the trustee's continuing interest in the
proceeds. However, the trustee failed to file formal objections within the time
designated for filing objections.' In one of two consolidated cases in Earnest, the
trustee filed a formal objection one year after the debtor received the proceeds of
the sale of homestead property. In the other, the debtor requested a determination
by the court of the exempt status of the homestead proceeds.
The court concluded that, because the debtors "received actual notice from their
trustees very early in their proceedings that the trustees questioned the status of the
allegedly exempt promissory notes,"78 "the steps the trustees did take were
sufficient to bring the issue before the court in a timely manner with sufficient
notice to interested parties and met the intent of the rule."" The court found
support for this conclusion by recognizing that "the purpose of the time limits under
... Bankruptcy 4003 is to encourage early determination of exemption questions
so all parties may then freely pursue their rights with regard to the exempt
property."' To achieve this end, the court resolved that Rule 4003 "also establishes
73. In re Earnest, 42 B.R. 395, 401 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1984); In re Stares, 52 B.R. 405, 409 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1985).
74. See Young, 806 F.2d at 1305 ("The basic purpose of the thirty day requirement in Rule 4003(b)
is to ensure timely notice to debtors that the trustee objects to their claimed exemptions."); see also In
re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1392 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit "that the primary
purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to ensure timely notice of the trustees objection to a claimed exemption.");
Geekie v. Owens (In re Owen), 74 B.R. 697, 698 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1987) ("[T]he Court believes the
Trustee has complied with the basic purpose of the thirty day requirement of Rule 4003(b), which is to
ensure timely notice to debtors that the trustee objects to their claimed exemptions."); In re Stanley, 143
B.R. 900, 904 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
75. 42 B.R. 395 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
76. Id. at 396-97. Earnest actually involves two separate cases in which each debtor sold their
respective homes prior to filing bankruptcy. Both debtors received promissory notes as consideration for
the respective transfers. Within a year of each transaction, the debtors filed bankruptcy and each claimed
the proceeds of the promissory notes exempt as homestead property.
77. See id. at 400. Rule 4003 was not in effect at the time of the trustees' decisions not to file
formal objections to the claims of exemption. The trustees failed to follow procedures established by
local bankruptcy rules for filing timely objections to the debtor's claims of exemptions. Id.
78. Id. at 401.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 401.
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a notice procedure to alert the debtors that the property claimed exempt cannot be
so treated until the controversy surrounding its status is resolved.""1
In In re Starns,z the court refused to treat the limitations period of Rule 4003
as a "technical pleading requirement."" The trustee in Starns filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay before the meeting of creditors.' The trustee sought
relief from the automatic stay to institute foreclosure proceedings against all
nonexempt real property, including two tracts of real estate the debtor claimed as
exempt. The debtor argued that because the motion for relief from the automatic
stay was filed before the meeting of creditors, and hence before Rule 4003(b)'s
thirty-day period began to run, the motion did not qualify as an objection filed
within thirty days following the meeting of creditors as Rule 4003(b) requires.
Adopting the rationale of Earnest, the court in Starns determined that the intent
of Rule 4003 was satisfied because "the Debtor received actual notice from
Freedman early in the proceeding that the scheduled exemptions were disputed.""5
According to the court, the steps taken by the trustee in filing the motion for relief
from the automatic stay before the beginning of the limitations period of Rule
4003(b) "were sufficient to bring the issue before the court in a timely manner with
sufficient notice to interested parties. ' 6 ,
Other courts have further refined the informal objection doctrine by merging the
notice-based theory and the surrogate objection theory, so that even where the
surrogate objection is filed within the limitations period, the surrogate objection
must withstand scrutiny under the notice-based analysis.'
The Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Peterson" illustrates this merger. The
debtors' initial bankruptcy schedules did not indicate that they had an ownership
interest in a house they built on land owned by the debtor's father. Approximately
one month after the meeting of creditors, the trustee sent a letter to the debtors
informing them that he would seek recovery of the value of the improvements
81. Id.
82. 52 B.R. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
83. Id. at 410.
84. Rule 4003(b) mtasures the thirty-day period for filing objections to the debtor's claimed
exemption beginning afte7 conclusion of the meeting of creditors.
85. Starns, 52 B.R. .t 411.
86. Id. at 411. Where the debtor claimed an annuity as exempt property after the trustee filed a
motion claiming an interest in the annuity contract, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Debtor amended his filing statement to include the annuity he claims to be exempt only
after Trustee filed a motion arguing that the annuity is part of the bankruptcy estate.
Trustee levied his objections, thus effectively complying with the rule, prior to Debtors
amending of his statement. Debtor does not, and surely cannot, complain that he did not
have actual notice of Trustee's objections. To allow Debtor to gain refuge behind Rule
4003(b) when he amended his financial statement in response to Trustee's objections
would be to elevate form over substance.
In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1986).
87. See In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (8th Cir. 1990); Palatine National Bank v. Harrigan
(In re Harrigan), 74 B.R. 224, 229-30 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1987); Geekie v. Owen (In re Owen), 74 B.R.
697, 698 (Bankr. C.D. 11. 1987); In re Stanley, 143 B.R. 900, 904 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
88. 920 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1990). Peterson was decided before Taylor.
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constructed on the land. The trustee advised the debtors they could avoid this if
they amended the bankruptcy schedules to claim the property as exempt. Almost
a year later the trustee sent a second letter to the debtors informing them that he
might file fraudulent transfer actions to recover the value of real estate for the
bankruptcy estate.
Later that month the trustee filed an adversary action in which he sought
alternative remedies: either to have the bankruptcy court transfer the value of the
property to the estate or, if the court determined that constructing improvements on
the land constituted a transfer, to nullify this transfer. On June 14, 1988, the debtors
amended their bankruptcy schedules and asserted a homestead exemption claim in
the home. The trustee did not file a formal objection to the debtors' exemption
claim until July 18, 1988, well beyond the limitations period of Rule 4003(b). The
trustee argued that his objection was not untimely because his previous letters to the
debtors and the adversary proceeding filed against the debtors provided actual notice
that the trustee objected to the debtors' claim of exemption.89
The Eighth Circuit ruled that neither the trustee's correspondence to the debtors
nor the complaint filed in the bankruptcy court provided notice sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 4003(b).' In rejecting the trustee's reliance on both the
In re Owen9 and In re Young' decisions, the Court pronounced that surrogate
objections must also meet the notice-based standard in order to satisfy the notice
requirement of Rule 4003(b). According to the court, the merger standard was
implicit in both the Owen93 and Young9' decisions relied on by the trustees. The
trustee's complaint in the Owen decision, according to the Eighth Circuit in
Peterson, "expressly objected to the homestead exemption. "" It follows, therefore,
that the Owen decision stands for the proposition that there must be an express
objection to the claimed exemption in the surrogate document if the surrogate
objection is to satisfy the notice requirement of Rule 4003(b).
In distinguishing the Young decision, the Eighth Circuit in Peterson decided that
the surrogate objection would also satisfy the notice requirements of Rule 4003(b)
if the trustee implicitly objected to the debtor's claim of exemption. According to
the court, the requirement that something in the complaint must put the debtor on
notice of the trustee's objection to the claimed exemption logically follows from the
following statement by the Young court: "Debtor does not, and surely cannot,
complain that he did not have actual notice of Trustee's objections."" "The logical
implication of this statement is that there must have been something in the
89. See id. at 1391.
90. Id. ("[N]owhere in the Trustee's complaint or his correspondence with the Debtors is there any
mention of the claimed homestead exemption's invalidity under the relevant law.").
91. 74 B.R. 697 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
92. 806 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1987).
93. See Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1391.
94. See id. at 1392.
95. See id. at 1391.
96. Young, 806 F.2d at 1305.
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complaint that provided notice of the trustee's objection."' "[T]here [was] nothing
in the Trustee's complaint or correspondence that would put the Debtors on notice
that the Trustee objected to their claimed ... exemption." 8 Therefore, regardless
of the form of notice to the debtor," the actions of the trustee must satisfy the
notice-based theory. "
3. Relation Back Doctrine
a) Relation Back and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)
The "relation back" doctrine, as expressed in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, has both common law and statutory roots."' This doctrine was
regularly applied by federal courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules.'" The
principal concept underlying Rule 15 is that once suit is instituted, the parties are not
entitled to the protection afforded by the statute of limitations against a claim or
defense, later asserted in an amended pleading, that arose out of the same conduct
or transaction that was the basis for the original suit.'"
Rule 15(c) 4 establishes the standard for determining when an amendment will
relate back to the date of the originally filed pleading. Under the Rule, if a claim or
defense asserted in an amended pleading arises out of the same conduct, transaction,
or occurrence established in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading.'" The amendment will not relate back if it asserts a
cause of action founded on a different transaction,1" separate acts,'"7 "separate
97. Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1392.
98. Id ; see also In re Harrigan, 74 B.R. 224, 230 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("The Bank cannot
escape the requirements of Rule 4003(b) by initiating state court proceedings that did not adequately put
the debtors on notice that their exemptions were being contested."); In re Brawn, 138 B.R. 327, 333
(Bankr. D. Me. 1992) ("Thus, although they did not file a distinct objection at first, plaintiffs manifested
their intention to contest Hayward's $60,000 exemption claim and effectively communicated that intention
to Hayward and the court well within Rule 4003(b)'s thirty day period."); In re Stanley, 143 B.R. 900,
904 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) ("In this case, it is clear that the debtor and her attorney were quite aware
of the Bank's objection to the propriety of the debtor's exemption claimed .... In its motion [for relief
from the automatic stay], the Bank alleged that the debtor held no equity in the real estate in question,
which would preclude the debtor from claiming the homestead exemption under Missouri law.").
99. Some courts have limited the form notice within the limitation period must take. Therefore,
a letter to the debtor that the trustee questions the exemptions claim may not be a formal enough
document. See Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1392.
100. See id.
101. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1471 (1990)
[hereinafter WRIGHT].
102. See id. at 503.
103. See 6A WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 1496 at 64.
104. FED. R. CIv. PRO. 15(c) in relevant part provides: "An amendment of a pleading relates back
to the date of the original pleading when .... (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading . I..." d.
105. See id.
106. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Norris, 830 F.Supp. 351, 360-61 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (claim based
on new loan does not relrte back).
107. See Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1014 (1lth Cir.
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violation of the same statute,"'8 separate occurrence,'9 or separate conduct1 "
than in the original pleading. However, changing the theory relied on in the initial
complaint does not run afoul of Rule 15(c),"' neither does an amendment "co-
rrect[ing] technical deficiencies or expand[ing] or modify[ing] the facts alleged in the
earlier pleading,". so long as the modification or correction does not "significantly
alter the claim or defense.""M
Rule 15(c)'s function is not simply to promote the joinder of claims and parties."4
If its function were merely to promote joinder of parties and claims, the "identity of
transaction" test discussed above would be the only criterion for determining whether
amendments relate back."' However, since Rule 15(c)'s primary function is to
ameliorate the effects of the statute of limitations when amendments are made after
expiration of the period of limitation,"' courts reason that the original pleading must
also provide the defendant adequate notice of acts giving rise to the claims in
subsequent amendments."7 The notice requirement is a judicially imposed element
1986) (claims based on two allegedly fraudulent transactions did not relate back to. original complaint,
which alleged a separate transaction); Gromes v. Avco Corp., 964 F.2d 1330, 1334 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("To
the extent that the 1987 refusal was a separate act, then Gromes' claim does not relate back to the date
of the initial filing since that filing related only to the 1985 events."); In re Commonwealth OiliTesoro
Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (amended complaint did not relate
back to original complaint, since it "allege[d] new events not even mentioned in the original complaint");
In re Crazy Eddie Secur. Litig., 747 F.Supp. 850, 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (claims in amended complaint
relating to stock sales in December 1985 and March 1986 did not relate back to original complaint,
which alleged material misstatements in connection with sale in March 1985); In re Bausch & Lomb
Secur. Litig., 941 F.Supp. 1352, 1366 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("In addition, these claims do not meet Rule
15(c)(2)'s requirement that 'the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading ....'
The October 13 press release was not mentioned in the prior pleadings and constitutes a separate alleged
act of fraud.").
108. 6A WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 1497 at 74.
109. See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 808 F.Supp.
1474, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992).
110. See 6A WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 1497 at 70-74.
111. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bennett, 898 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The fact that
an amendment changes the legal theory on which the action initially was brought is of no consequence
if the factual situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to
defendant's attention by the original pleading." (quoting 6A. WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 149 at 94)).
112. See 6A WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 1497 at 74.
113. Id. at 84.
114. See Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 808 F.Supp.
1474, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992) ("Because the rationale of the relation back rule is to ameliorate the effect
of the statute of limitations rather than to promote the joinder of claims and parties, the standard for
determining whether amendments qualify under Rule 15(c) is not simply an identity of transaction test;
although not expressly mentioned in the rule, the courts also inquire into whether the opposing party has
been put on notice regarding the claim raised by the amended pleading." (footnote omitted)).
115. See id.
116. Sed id.; see also 6A WRIGHT, supra note 101, § 1497 at 85.
117. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984).
The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation
concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations
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of Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine."' Therefore, only if the initial pleading
"g[a]ve the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests""' 9 will the original pleading be one that could be rehabilitated by
Rule 15(c)(2)." It is this judicially imposed notice requirement that is the basis for
application of Rule 15(c)(2)'s relation back doctrine to informal objections to
exemption claims.
b) Relation Back and Notice-Based Informal Exemption Objections
Although the notice-based informal objection cases can be characterized as
implicitly applying the relation back doctrine, only a small number of bankruptcy
courts have expressly applied Rule -15(c) in determining whether an amended
objection relates back to an earlier objection filed within the limitations period of
Rule 4003(b).' Bankruptcy courts relying on Rule 15(c) to determine whether a
late-filed objection relates back to an earlier objection have done so without
considering whether the court is authorized to apply Rule 15(c) to contested matters
such as proceedings involving objections to the debtor's claim of exemption."
were intended to provide. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require
a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief,
they do require that the pleadings "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Because the initial "pleading" did not
contain such notice, it was not an original pleading that could be rehabilitated by invoking
Rule 15(c).
Id. at 150 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1300 (5th Cir. 1971) ("As long as the amended complaint refers to the same
transaction or occurrence that formed the basis for the original complaint and the defendant was put on
notice of the claim by the first complaint, there will be no bar to amendment; even new defendants and
new theories of recovery will be allowed."' (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 338 F.2d 229, 234 (5th
Cir. 1964))); Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563, 1566 (5th Cir. 1985) ("In determining
if an amended complaint relates back, this Court regards as 'critical' whether the opposing party was put
on notice regarding the claim raised therein." (citing Woods Exploration, 438 F.2d at 1299)).
118. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497 at 85
(2d ed. 1987) ("[Allthough not expressly mentioned in the rule, the courts also inquire into whether the
opposing party has been put on notice regarding the claim raised by the amended pleading.").
119. Baldwin County Welcome Center, 466 U.S. at 150 n.3 (quoting Conley v. Givson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957).
120. See id.
121. See In re Blum, 39 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) ("The Debtors have argued that the
objections to claimed e:emptions which were first presented by the amended objections should be
overruled as untimely and that the amendments should not relate back to the original, timely filing date.
See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). The Court agrees .... ); In re Froid, 89 B.R. 950, 952
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) ("Had the amended Objection merely raised new legal ground to support the
original timely filed Objection, then the amended Objection would relate back to the original Objection,"
(citing Blum)); In re Swift, 124 B.R. 475, 479 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) ("Under standard principles of
pleading, an amended pleading in pending litigation relates back to and supersedes the original pleading.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).").
122. See FED. R. CIv. PRO. 15. Rule 15 ordinarily only applies to adversary proceedings. Since an
objection to debtor's claim of exemptions is a contested matter, however, Rule 15 is inapplicable to this
proceeding. However, the Bankruptcy court has the discretion to apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, including Rule 15, to contested matters. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
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The court in In re Blum,' for example, applied Rule 15(c) to determine that an
amended objection to the debtors' exemption claims did not relate back to the initial
objection, since it dealt with different exempt property than that in the initial
objection." On the other hand, if the amendment had merely advanced a new
theory to support the original claim, the amendment would have related back to the
initial objection."2 The trustee in Blum amended his objections to the debtors'
exemption claims. The alleged exempt property the trustee objected to in the original
objection was different from the property objected to in the amended objections.
The bankruptcy court summarily agreed with the debtors' contention that Rule
15(c) prevented the amended objection from relating back to the date of the trustee's
timely objections. The court agreed with the debtors because "'the original objections
clearly were directed only to the claimed exemptions for specific property then
totaling in value $17,460.53, and the amended objections did not merely raise new
legal grounds to support the original objections."'" The court concluded that "since
the objections set forth in the amended objections relate to different property claimed
as exempt than that referred to in the original objections, the amended objections do
not relate back to the original filing date.""V
The Court in Nuttleman v. Myers (In re Nuttleman)' refused to apply the
relation back doctrine where the original objection was dismissed because, according
to the court, there was not an original pleading to which the amendment could relate
back. 9 The trustee filed a timely objection to the debtors' claim of exemptions.
The bankruptcy court later denied the objection, because the trustee had not filed the
required proof of service.' The trustee then filed a second objection, along with
the required proof of service. The debtor contended the second objection was
untimely because it was filed beyond the thirty-day limitation period of Rule 4003(b).
The district court rejected the bankruptcy court's ruling that the trustee's second
objection related back to the date of the originally dismissed objection.'
The district court recognized that the 'relation back' doctrine is typically applied
in situations where an amended complaint is filed after the running of the applicable
statute of limitations,"'3 and that bankruptcy courts have applied the doctrine to
"cases involving situations where an amended objection to a claim of exemptions has
been filed."'' The court concluded that since the bankruptcy court's order dismis-
sing the original objection was neither vacated nor set aside,
123. 39 B.R. 897 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
124. See id. at 898-99.
125. See id. at 898.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 898-99.
128. 128 B.R. 254 (D. Neb. 1991).
129. See id. at 256.
130. See id. at 255.
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there was no original objection in [sic] which the February 28, 1990
objection could "relate back" to. To allow the objection to "relate back"
in this case would be like allowing an "amended" complaint to relate
back to an original complaint subsequent to its dismissal by the court in
order to avoid the statute of limitations. Clearly, this would be
improper.
134
The common element of both Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine and the notice-
based doctrine is notice to the debtor by the original pleading. The court's reference
to the notice-based cbjection cases in In re Sher 31 vaguely suggests that the notice-
based informal obje-tion doctrine was a disguised application of the relation back
doctrine. The court in Sherf considered objections to discharge analogous to informal
objections to claims of exemptions. The court justified application of the relation
back doctrine to Rule 4004's time deadline for objecting to discharge by relying on
notice-based informal objection cases." It was in making its reference to notice-
based cases that the court suggested that the notice-based informal objection doctrine
was a disguised application of the relation back doctrine. 37
The creditor in Sherf timely filed a document in the bankruptcy court denominated
an "objection to discharge."'3 The clerk of the bankruptcy court advised the
creditor that it should have filed a "complaint" objecting to discharge. After the
creditor filed a pleading denominated "complaint objecting to discharge," the
bankruptcy clerk's office informed the creditors that the complaint was improperly
filed.'39 The creditors then filed an untimely motion for leave to file a late
complaint objecting to discharge."4 The court's analysis in allowing the motion is
instructive.
The Sherf court relied on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Matter of McGuirtl' and
the bankruptcy court's decision in Rose v. Beltz (In re Beltz)" for the proposition
that an untimely filed objection to discharge could relate back to an earlier pleading,
if the earlier pleading provided the debtor actual notice of the existence and nature
of the objection to discharge.' In the next paragraph of the opinion, the Sherf court
noted that "[v]arious court rulings on the timeliness of the filing of pleading
involving deadlines set by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules have employed
134. Id.; see also Dade County v. Rohr Industries, 826 F.2d 983,989 (1 th Cir. 1987) (Dade County
failed to appeal the district court's dismissal of its initial complaint. It instead filed a second 6omplaint
that the court ruled was tme barred. The court refused to apply the relation back doctrine to find that
the second complaint was timely because it related back to the date of the initial complaint.).
135. 135 B.R. 810 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
136. See id. at 814.
137. See id. at 813.
138. Id. at 811.
139. See id. at 812.
140. See id.
141. 879 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1989).
142. 51 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
143. See Sherf, 135 B.R. at 812-13.
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the 'relation back' or notice based exception to the involved Bankruptcy Rule."' 44
One of the Bankruptcy Rules the court referred to was Rule 4003(b).
The facts of Starns,'"4 a notice-based informal objection case relied on by the
Sherf court, obscured the connection between the relation back and the notice-based
informal objection doctrines. Notice is the common element of both doctrines and
analysis of this element is identical in both doctrines. Because the trustee in Starns
never filed a formal objection to the debtor's exemption, the Starns court only
engaged in the first part of the analysis: whether a motion for relief from the
automatic stay could constitute the objection.'" The court concluded that the motion
could be the objection, because it provided the debtor notice that the trustee objected
to the claimed exemption.'4 The Starns court had no occasion to speak directly on
whether a subsequent filing could relate back because there was no subsequent filing
that could be argued was an amendment.
The Sherf decision was a precursor to those later decisions that can be construed
to support the notion that notice was a shared element of the notice-based informal
objection and the relation back doctrines. The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Halverson
v. Peterson (In re Peterson)'" can support the conclusion that the notice element
of both the notice-based informal objection and the relation back doctrines are
identical. In Peterson, the Eighth Circuit ruled that neither the trustee's correspon-
dence to the debtors nor the complaint filed in the bankruptcy court provided notice
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4003(b)." Before filing an adversary
action, the trustee in Peterson had informed the debtors that by amending their claim
of exemption, they would prevent the trustee from distributing certain property of the
estate. The court rejected the trustee's argument that his two letters to the debtors and
the adversary action he filed provided sufficient notice to meet the requirements of
Rule 4003(b). In its analysis, the court expressly articulated the test for determining
whether a surrogate objection satisfied the notice-based informal objection
doctrine."n The court's analysis of the Owen' and Young 52 decisions support
the contention that the notice-based informal objection doctrine was in fact a relation
back analysis.
The notice standard pronounced by the court in Peterson is the same standard for
determining whether the original objection provided the debtor sufficient notice to
justify application of the relation back doctrine. According to the Eighth Circuit in
Peterson, the original objection provides the debtor sufficient notice if in it the trustee
144. Id. at 813.
145. 52 B.R. 405 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
146. See id. at 411.
147. See id.
148. 920 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1990). See the discussion accompanying notes 88-89 for a detailed
analysis of the facts of Peterson.
149. See id. at 1391 ("[N]owhere in the Trustee's complaint or his correspondence with the Debtors
is there any mention of the claimed homestead exemption's invalidity under relevant law.").
150. See id. at 1393; see supra text accompanying notes 90-100.
151. Geekie v. Owen (In re Owen), 74 B.R. 697 (Bankr. C.D. II1. 1987).
152. Young v. Adler (In re Young), 806 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1987).
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expressly objects to the exemption claim." Implicated in the Peterson court's
determination that tie informal objection must expressly object to the exemption
claim is the conclusion that in order to relate back to an earlier filed informal
objection, the informal objection must expressly notify the debtor that the exemption
claim is disputed.
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the debtor is given the requisite notice if
the court finds that the trustee's objection to the debtor's exemption claim is implicit
from the language of the document."5 The same reasoning may be applied in
determining whether the prior document provided the debtor notice that the trustee
objects to the debtor's claim of exemption so that an untimely filed formal objection
would relate back to the timely informal objection. This conclusion follows from the
Peterson court's conclusion that something in the complaint impliedly put the debtor
on notice that the trustee objected to the claimed exemption. 5"
The notice-based objection cases represent an application of the notice element
of the relation back doctrine to informal objections to exemption claims. If the late-
filed formal objection to the debtor's claim of exemption arose out of the same
conduct, transaction, or occurrence established in the informal objection, the amended
or formal objection relates back to the timely informal notice of objection. Although
the notice-based objection cases did not expressly determine that the late-filed formal
objection arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the informal
objection, this conclusion is implied in those decisions.
Beyond the limits inherent in requiring both adequate notice to the debtor and
requiring that the formal objection arise out of the same transaction as the informal
objection, there are other limits on the relation back principle in this context. The
informal objection may be limited to documents that were filed. Rule 4003(b)
provides that "[tihe trustee ... may file objections to the list of property claimed as
exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors."'" The term
"file" under Rule 5005(a)" means filed with the clerk of the court in the district
where the bankruptcy case is pending. 8 The term can also mean filed with the
bankruptcy judge, if the judge so permits. '5  The term "file" also applies to a
153. See Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1392.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (emphasis added).
157. FED. R. BANKR, P. 5005(a). The Rule provides, in relevant part:
The lists, schelules, statements, proofs of claim or interest, complaints, motions,
applications, objections and other papers required to be filed by these rules, except as
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1409, shall. be filed with the clerk in the district where the case
under the Code is pending. The judge of that court may permit the papers to be filed with
the judge, in which event the filing date shall be noted thereon, and they shall be
forthwith transmitted to the clerk. The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any
petition or other paper presented for the purpose of filing solely because it is not presented
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document erroneously filed with specific officers of the court."w Therefore,
informal objections to which the relation back doctrine applies is limited to
documents delivered to the court, delivered to the clerk, or misdelivered to an officer
of the court or the trustee within the meaning of Rule 5005(c).''
Because Rule 4003(b) provides that "[t]he trustee or any creditor may file
objections,"'" it can be argued that filing an objection is permissive rather than
mandatory. Therefore, for the purpose of application of the relation back doctrine,
an objection need not be filed as defined by Rule 5005. If this argument is valid, the
number of documents that would qualify as informal objections would be larger than
the class of documents defined in Rule 5005. Under this analysis, there would be no
requirement that the document be filed. The bankruptcy court asked to determine
whether an informal objection satisfies the relation back doctrine and would not be
limited to relying only on documents that were filed with the bankruptcy court and
its officers.
Since filing an objection would not be required under this theory, the first issue
in application of the relation back doctrine would therefore be whether the debtor had
notice within the limitations period that her exemption claim was disputed. That
notice may come from an objection to the debtor's discharge, a motion for relief from
the automatic stay, or a letter mailed to the debtor. If the debtor has notice within the
limitations period of Rule 4003(b) that the exemption claim is disputed, the formal
objection, although filed after expiration of the limitations period, would relate back
to the date notice was given to the debtor. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent
with the text of Rule 4003(b), which does not make objecting to the debtor's
exemption claims mandatory. Deciding whether or not to object to the debtor's claim
of exemption is left to the discretion of the trustee. However, if the trustee does
decide to object, the objection must be a writing filed with the bankruptcy court.'"
4. Strict Constructionist Doctrine
Although the issue of whether an informal exemption objection may serve as an
objection under Rule 4003(b) was not before the Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz,'" some courts have considered the "strict constructionist"
doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court equally applicable to informal objections
160. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(c). The Rule provides, in relevant part:
A paper intended to be filed with the clerk but erroneously delivered to the United
States trustee, the trustee, the attorney for the trustee, a bankruptcy judge, a district judge,
or the clerk of the district court shall, after the date of its receipt has been noted thereon,
be transmitted forthwith to the clerk of the bankruptcy court .... In the interest ofjustice,
the court may order that a paper erroneously delivered shall be deemed filed with the
clerk or transmitted to the United States trustee as of the date of its original delivery.
Id.
161. See In re Vaughn Chevrolet, Inc., 160 B.R. 316 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1993) (analyzing an
informal proof of claim).
162. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) ("The trustee ... may file objections to the list of property claimed
as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors ... .
163. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
164. 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
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to exemption claims." Although some courts have limited the Taylor decision in
significant ways," others have ruled that Taylor precludes application of the,
surrogate objection and the notice-based informal objection doctrines. 67 In re
Canino" illustrates application of the strict constructionist doctrine to informal
objection to claims of exemption."'
The debtors70 claimed the equity in their residence, $155,053.57, as exempt
under the homestead exemption. This exemption claim exceeded the statutory
exemption available under California law. The debtors also claimed the value of their
1991 Ford Escort, $7500, as exempt. This exemption claim exceeded the statutory
exemption limit by $6300.
The trustee did not file a formal written objection to the debtors' exemption claim.
The trustee, however, had taken a course of action that could be interpreted as
inconsistent with recognizing the legitimacy of the debtors' exemption claims. First,
the trustee moved to employ a real estate broker to sell the debtors' residence. After
initially denying the trustee's motion, the bankruptcy court granted the motion. After
the residence was sold, the trustee claimed that the sale proceeds which exceeded the
debtors' statutory homestead exemption limit was available for distribution to
creditors. The trustee also took possession of the debtors' vehicle and notified all
interested parties of his intention to sell the automobile. The sale of the automobile
was conducted three days before the conclusion of the meeting of creditors. The
trustee turned over only $1200 to the debtor, $6300 less than the exempt amount
claimed by the debtors. The debtors asserted that the trustee could not contest the
exemption claim for the first time after expiration of the thirty-day limitations period.
The trustee, however, argued that his actions, all of which occurred within the thirty-
165. See Canino v. Bleau (In re Canino), 185 B.R. 584 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Clark v. Kazi (In
re Kazi), 125 B.R. 981, 989 (Bankr. S.D. 111. 1991), affd, No. 91-001690-WDS, 1992 WL 611260 (S.D.
II1. Jan. 21, 1992), affid, 985 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1993).
166. See Brayshaw v. Brayshaw (In re Brayshaw), 912 F.2d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1990) (ruling that
the bankruptcy court must actually grant the trustee's motion to extend the period for objecting to the
debtor's exemption before expiration of the 30-day period in Rule 4003(b)); Mercer v. Monzack, 53 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Nothing in Taylor intimates that 'property of the estate' not plainly listed in
Schedule B-4 nonetheless becomes exempt by operation of law under section 522(l)."); Alderman v.
Martinson (In re Alderman), 195 B.R. 106, 110 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the Taylor decision
does not allow challenges to the validity of exemption after expiration of the 30-day limitation period,
but does allow challenges to valuation of the property the debtor claims as exempt after expiration of
the limitation period); Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 601 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1994), aifd, 45 F.3d 957
(5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the bankruptcy court must act to grant the extension for objecting to the
debtor's exemption claim before expiration of the 30-day period of Rule 4003(b)).
167. See Canino, 185 B.R. at 592 (Since Rule 4003(b) "does not provide for a formal objection, it
is illogical that there could be an informal objection under its provisions.'); Kazi, 125 B.R. at 989
("Whether debtors had actual notice of the objections within the time period prescribed by Rule 4003(b),
however, is irrelevant."); Kazi, 985 F.2d at 322 ("Moreover, Taylor forecloses the trustee's 'actual notice'
argument.").
168. 185 B.R. 584 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
169. See id at 592.
170. This case was originally filed as a joint petition. One of the joint petitioners who had been
placed under conservatorship was dismissed from the bankruptcy case. Id. at 587-88.
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day period of Rule 4003(b), constituted an informal objection to the debtors' claimed
exemption. Therefore, his objection was timely.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel framed the issue as follows:
"Whether the bankruptcy court erred by concluding that Trustee's activities in relation
to the sale and distribution of the assets claimed by Debtor as exempt constituted an
informal objection.. .." The debtor contended that the Taylor decision, requiring
strict construction of the provisions of Rule 4003(b), was controlling. Therefore, the
court was compelled to reject application of an informal objection doctrine.
In distinguishing its case from the Taylor decision, the Canino court noted several
factual dissimilarities. In particular, the trustee in Taylor did nothing in response to
the debtor's exemption claim, while the trustee in Canino took several steps that were
inconsistent with the debtor's exemption claim, including, "[taking] possession of the
car, notic[ing] it for sale and [selling] it,... [and] appl[ying] for employment of a
real estate broker to sell the residence . ".'.."n The court, however, did not agree
that the actions of the trustee rose to the level of an objection under Rule 4003.'"
The court reasoned that in taking possession of the car, selling it, and in employing
a real estate broker to sell the debtor's residence, the trustee was simply acting in
accordance with his statutory duties to collect property of the estate and convert it
to money." If the trustee believed the exemption claim was invalid, "it was his
duty to object to the claimed exemptions, which he did not do."'"
The court disagreed with the bankruptcy court's ruling that the actions of the
trustee constituted an informal objection.76 The court also rejected the bankruptcy
court's analogizing informal objections under Rule 4003 to informal proof of claims
under Rule 3001(a)."n To successfully reach its conclusion that the trustee's actions
amounted to an informal objection, the bankruptcy court assumed that the reasoning
which led courts to adopt informal proof of claims under Rule 3001(a) could be
applied to Rule 4003.2 According to the court, the procedure for objecting to
exemption claims under Rule 4003 is so substantially different from the procedural
requirements of Rule 3001 that reliance on analysis of informal proof of claims cases
is not justified." Rule 3001 prescribes an official form for filing proof of claims.
No such official form exists, nor does Rule 4003 prescribe an official form for
objecting to exemption claims."
171. Id. at 589.
172. Id. at 591.
173. See id
174. See id
175. Id. at 592.
176. See id
177. See id. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a) in relevant part provides that "[a] proof of claim is a written
statement setting forth a creditor's claim. A proof of claim shall conform substantially to the appropriate
Official Form."
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Further, a liberal amendment policy under Rule 3001 has led to validation of
informal proofs of claims." An informal proof of claim is logical because Rule
3001 explicitly provides an official form, and from this official form courts may
determine whether the informal proof of claim arose "out of demands against the
estate or out of correspondence between a creditor and the trustee or debtor-in-
possession which demonstrates an intent on the part of the creditor to assert a claim
against the bankruptcy estate."" This liberal amendment policy is contrasted with
the narrow construction policy established by the Supreme Court in Taylor."' Rule
4003 "does not allude to an official form or specific writing, which could generate
errors that amount to technicalities leading to a need to promote liberal
amendment."'" According to the Canino court, since Rule 4003 "does not provide
for a formal objection, it is illogical that there could be an informal objection under
its provision. In other words, there is either an objection or no objection."'85
Finally, the court concluded that the trustee's actions did not satisfy the notice-
based informal objection doctrine. According to the court, even if it were to accept
the informal objection doctrine for the sake of argument, the trustee's actions did not
satisfy its requirements. Drawing on the informal proof of claims analysis, the court
noted that the lesson learned from informal proof analysis "is that the objection must
be explicit and not prejudicial to the debtor. '"" The trustee's actions did not,
according to the court, "constitute an explicit objection to the debtor's claimed
exemptions.""' Condoning de facto objections under Rule 4003 would encourage
trustees and creditors to improperly seize assets as a means of informally objecting
to the debtor's claimed exemptions, which may offend debtors due process rights."'
It could be argued that the debtor in Canino had no notice of the trustee's objection
to the claimed exemption." The decision, therefore, does not foreclose application
of the notice-based doctrine. This issue was considered by the Seventh Circuit in In
re Kazi." In that case the "debtors had actual notice of the trustee's opposition to




184. Id. at 592.
185. Id.
186. See id at 59 1.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 592. The court stated:
Unfortunately, it appear; that to condone de facto objections under... [Rule] 4003, would mean that
trustees and creditors everywhere will be improperly seizing assets .... [Rule] 4003 also provides
for notice and hearing on the objection. The panel has grave misgivings that Trustee's actions, if
accepted as an informal objection, would violate Debtor's due process rights or, at the least, be
prejudicial to Debtor.
Id.
189. See id. at 591 ("Debtor stated that Trustee's actions were 'confusing' because she thought she
was entitled to retain possession of the assets.").
190. 985 F.2d 318 (71h Cir. 1993).
191. Id. at 320 ("The parties agree also that debtors had actual notice of the trustee's opposition to
the claimed exemption within the 30-day period.").
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The trustee in Kazi argued "that failure to file a written objection to claimed
exemption within the 30-day period does not mean a court may not consider the
objection if the debtors had actual notice of the objection."'9 The Kazi court
rejected this argument, ruling that Taylor "forecloses the trustee's 'actual notice'
argument." 93 The court adopted the literal interpretative approach of Taylor.
According to the court in Kazi, "[i]f the time limitation of Rule 4003(b) is to be
interpreted literally, it follows that the requirement of written objections should also
be interpreted literally. It would be inconsistent with Taylor's emphasis on finality
to allow objecting parties to raise the issue of the debtors' actual notice of opposition
to claimed exemptions after the 30-day period has run."'"
The strict constructionist doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court is equally
applicable to informal objections to exemption claims,"9 ' and requires rejection of
informal objections that do not meet the requirements of Rule 4003(b). At minimum,
the language of Rule 4003(b) limits what constitutes an informal objection. Rule
4003(b) provides that "[tihe trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of
property claimed as exempt."'" The word "may" is "here used in its usual
signification, there being nothing to show the intention of... [the Supreme Court]
to affix to any other meaning."'" Usually the word "may" implies permissive or
discretionary conduct.' The word is an "auxiliary verb, qualifying the meaning of
another verb . . . ."" The verb whose meaning the word "may" qualifies is the
verb "file." Whatever meaning is given to the verb "file," that meaning is qualified
in that the conduct, to "file," is permissive, not mandatory. Therefore, although the
trustee is not required by Rule 4003(b) to file an objection to every claim of
exemption made by debtors, the trustee may, at her discretion, file an objection to the
debtors' claims of exemption.
The fact that the trustee has discretion to file or not to file gives us no clue as to
the nature of the objection that Rule 4003(b) requires. The meaning of the word
"file," however, tells what discretion the trustee has with regard to objections she
does file. Under Rule 5005(a),an "objections and other papers required to be filed
192. Id. at 321.
193. Id. at 322.
194. Ild.
195. See In re Canino, 185 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. App. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981,
988 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
196. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (emphasis added).
197. United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914). The advisory notes
to the 1991 amendments to Rule 4003 shed some light on the meaning Congress intended: "Subdivision
(b) is intended to facilitate the filing of objections to exemptions claimed on a supplemental schedule
filed under Rule 1007(h)." FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 advisory note.
198. See Shea v. Shea, 537 P.2d 417, 418 (Okla. 1975).
199. Lexington Mill, 232 U.S. at 411.
200. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(a). The Rule provides, in relevant part:
The lists, schedules, statements, proofs of claim or interest, complaints, motions,
applications, objections and other papers required to be filed by these rules, except as
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1409, shall be filed with the clerk in the district where the case
under the Code is pending. The judge of that court may permit the papers to be filed with
1997]
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by these rules ... shall be filed with the, clerk in the district where the case under
the Code is pending."'" Requiring the trustee to file the objection with the clerk
in the district where the bankruptcy case is pending eliminates a series of items from
consideration as objections. Conduct cannot be filed. Therefore, conduct that could
be interpreted as inconsistent with recognizing the legitimacy of the debtor's
exemption claims cannot constitute an objection.'
The Kazi and Canino decisions are correct. In Kazi, the court ruled that Taylor
foreclosed the argument that actual notice to the debtor, without a written objection,
could satisfy Rule 4003(b)'s requirement to timely file an objection.' In Canino,
the appellate court rejected the informal objection doctrine, not only because "it is
illogical that there could be an informal objection . . . . " but also because
conduct providing th;, debtor notice does not rise to the level of an informal
objection.'
the judge, in which event the filing date shall be noted thereon, and they shall be
forthwith transmitted to the clerk. The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any
petition or other paper presented for the purpose of filing solely because it is not presented
in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices.
Id.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. See Canino, 185 B.R. at 591.
203. The filing must be a writing. In re Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1993). Although filing
means submitting a writing to the Clerk, the bankruptcy court has discretion to accept a written objection
as filed under Rule 5005(a) if the objection it is filed with the bankruptcy judge, rather than the clerk
of the court. See FED. R. B ANKR. P. 5005(a), which provides that "objections and other papers required
to befiled by these rules., . shall be filed with the clerk in the district where the case under the Code
in pending. . . ." The rule also prohibits the clerk from refusing "to accept for filing any petition or
other paper presented for the purpose of filing solely because it is not presented in proper form as
required by these rules or any local rules or practices." Id. (emphasis added). The objection is also
considered filed if erroneously delivered to the "United States trustee, the trustee, the attorney for the
trustee, a bankruptcy judge, a district judge, or the clerk of the district court ...." FED. R. BANKR. P.
5005(c). The Rule provides, in relevant part:
A paper intended to be filed with the clerk but erroneously delivered to the United
States trustee, the trustee, the attorney for the trustee, a bankruptcy judge, a district judge,
or the clerk of the district court shall, after the date of its receipt has been noted thereon,
be transmitted forthwith to the clerk of the bankruptcy court . . . . In the interest of
justice, the court mEy order that a paper erroneously delivered shall be deemed filed with
the clerk or transmitted to the United States trustee as of the date of its original delivery.
Id.
204. See Kazi, 985 F.2d at 322. In Kazl, the court stated:
Moreover, Taylor forecloses the trustees "actual notice" argument. If the time
limitation of Rule 4003(b) is to be interpreted literally, it follows that the requirement of
written objections should also be interpreted literally. It would be inconsistent with
Taylor's emphasis cn finality to allow objecting parties to raise the issue of the debtors'
actual notice of opposition to claimed exemptions after the 30-day period has run.
Therefore, summary judgment for the debtors is affirmed on the issue under the "literal"
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Taylor.
Id.
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These decisions may be limited to their facts. If a document is filed as that term
is defined under Rule 5005(a), and the document explicitly objects to the debtor's
exemption claim, it will constitute a valid objection under Rule 4003(b). This will
be so regardless of whether the document is denominated an "Objection to Exemption
Claims" or "Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay."
11. Section 522(1), a Statute of Repose or Statute of Limitations?
Congress, in enacting section 522(1), promulgated a statutory provision that created
corresponding rights in debtors and trustees. Rule 4003(b) simply limits the period
within which those rights could be exercised. Under section 522(1), the bankruptcy
debtor who properly files the list of property she claims is exempt has an inchoate
exemption right that will vest unless a party in interest timely objects to the
exemption claim." The trustee can effectively prevent the debtor's exemption right
from vesting, if he timely objects.2 The trustee's right to prevent vesting of the
debtor's exemption right may not be exercised if the objection is not filed within the
limitations period of Rule 4003(b).
Section 522(1) may be considered as either a statute of limitation or a statute of
repose. Whether section 522(1) is a statute of limitation or a statute of repose may
significantly affect bankruptcy courts' authority to apply the informal objection and
relation back doctrines in resolving whether objections to the debtor's claim of
exemption were timely filed, and may affect the trustee's ability to rely on those
doctrines in an effort to prevent vesting of the debtor's exemption right.
After a general analysis of statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, this section
of the article will argue that section 522(1) is more in the nature of a statute of
repose. Therefore, after expiration of the repose period of Rule 4003(b), the trustee's
right to object to the debtor's claim of exemption terminates. The fact that the
trustee's objection right terminates after expiration of the repose period will not
significantly affect reliance on the notice-based informal objection theories or the
relation back doctrine.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994). Section 522(1), in relevant part, provides that "[t]he debtor shall file
a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section .... Unless a
party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt." See also Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-44 ("The Bankruptcy Court did not extend the 30-day period.
Section 522(1) therefore has made the property exempt. [The trustee] cannot contest the exemption at this
time whether or not [the debtor] had a colorable statutory basis for claiming it.").
208. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) establishes the time period for objecting to the debtor's list of
exemptions. In relevant part, it provides:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property claimed as exempt
within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule
2003(a) or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless,
within such period, further time is granted by the Court.
Id.
209. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 643.
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A. Overview of Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitations
Courts have not always been consistent in distinguishing between statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose Unless there is an understanding of what
meaning to attach to the term "statute of repose," there can be analytical difficul-
ties!" Professor McGovern, a noted commentator on the constitutionality of
statutes of repose, recognized five definitional formulations for distinguishing statutes
of limitation and statutes of repose. Only four of those formulations are relevant for
the purpose of this discussion. Under the first formulation, statutes of repose and
statutes of limitation are identical creatures: they are legislative enactments that
prescribe the period within which a cause of action may be brought.212 "Older
treatise writers and judges often used.'repose' and 'limitations' interchangeably. 2 1 3
Statutes of limitation and statutes of repose may also be distinguished on policy
grounds. Under the second formulation, limitation statutes serve a more limited
function than do statutes of repose. Statutes of limitation serve to "reduce the
evidentiary inequities created when defendants are forced to defend stale claims." '
Evidentiary inequities arise because, under the "discovery rule," ' a statute of
limitation begins to run when the cause of action accrues, that is when the plaintiff
knows or should have known of her injuries 6 Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff
may not learn of her injuries for many years after the injuries occur.! Because a
statute of limitation designates the time period, beginning with when injuries were
discoverable, within which a cause of action must be filed, statutes of limitation
"represent a public p)licy judgment by .. . [legislatures] as to the time at which an
210. See Josephine H. Hicks, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38
VAND. L. REV. 627, 628 (1985) ("The terms 'statute of repose' can create analytical difficulties because
it lacks a precise definition and often is confused with 'statute of limitations."'); Lisa K. Mehs, Asbestos
Litigation and Statutes of Repose: The Application of the Discovery Rule in the Eight Circuit Allows
Plaintiffs to Breathe Easier, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 965, 966 (1991); Mark W. Peacock, An Equitable
Approach to Products Liability Statutes of Repose, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 223, 226 (1993);.
211. See Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability
Statutes of Repose, 30 Art. U. L. REv. 579, 582 (1981).
212. Ild.
213. McGovern, supra note 211, at 582-83.
214. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583; see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304
(1945). In Chase,
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than
in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and
pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared,
and evidence has been lost.
Id. at 314; see also Rumbcrg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F.Supp. 294,298 (D.Cal. 1976) ("The purpose
of the statute of limitations, in the oft-quoted words of Justice Holmes is to "(prevent) surprise through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared."').
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action becomes too stale to proceed in its courts." ' The primary concern is the
prevention of stale claims, rather than the repose which the defendant receives
because the limitations period has run. The repose given defendants by statutes of
limitation is an incidental benefit."9
In contrast, a repose statute is "an act that promotes a policy of finality in legal
relationships . . . ."' The primary function served by statutes of repose is "to
relieve potential defendants from anxiety over liability for acts committed long
ago."" While a statute of limitations defines the period within which, after the
plaintiff knows or should have known of her injuries, a cause of action must be filed,
a statute of repose "limits potential liability by limiting the time during which a cause
of action can arise."' Because statutes of repose "make the filing of suit within a
specified time period a substantive part of plaintiffs cause of action,"'m they are
considered substantive provisions.m The time for filing suit, with a repose statute,
218. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Statutes of limitation, then, are
primarily instruments of public policy and of court management, and do not confer upon defendants any
right to be free from liability, .. . although this may be their effect.") (citation omitted).
219. See id.
220. McGovern, supra note 211, at 583. According to Professor McGovern, a variety of statutory
devices may be used to accomplish this result and, hence, because these may employ "[viarious types
of prescriptive time periods ... [the time periods may] be defined as repose periods." Id. These include
statutes of limitation, escheat, and adverse possession. However, according to McGovern, a statute of
limitation "is designed to accomplish the more limited function of reducing the evidentiary inequities
created when defendants are forced to defend stale claims." Id.; see also Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 302 ("[The
statute of repose... embodies two essential and related purposes: to prevent indefinite potential liability
for a particular act or omission .... and second, to afford defendants ... greater certainty in predicting
potential liability."); Shadbume v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 851 F.Supp. 712,715 (D. Md. 1994)
(identifying the second policy underlying statutes of repose and stating that "people are entitled to plan
their affairs with certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential
liability"); Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ("The three-year-limit in the
medical malpractice statute of repose provided certainty as to the time period during which a health care
provider may be subject to potential liability .... ), overruled by Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910
(Tenn. 1995). The Cronin decision did not overrule Bruce v. Hamilton's analysis of the distinction
between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation. The Cronin court disagreed with Hamilton's ruling
that Tennessee's saving statute was not applicable to Tennessee's statute of repose. Cronin, 906 S.W.2d
at 913.
221. Goad, 831 F.2d at 511.
222. Hinkle, 85 F.3d at 301; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472
(10th Cir. 1996) ("A statute of repose presents 'an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer
exists .... .- (quoting First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co., 882
F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989))); Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1995) ("A
statute of repose, on the other hand, directly impacts on the accrual of a cause of action in the first
instance. It operates as a statutory bar independent of the actions (or inaction) of the litigants - often
before those litigants can ever be identified.") (citation omitted).
223. Goad, 831 F.2d at 511.
224. See id. at 511 ("Statutes of repose are meant to be a substantive definition of rights as
distinguished from a procedural limitation on the remedy used to enforce rights."); Delon Hampton &
Assoc., Chartered v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 943 F.2d 355, 360-361 (4th Cir. 1991)
("unlike a "pure" statute of limitation that merely bars the maintenance of a remedy, the statute of repose
bars the remedy and extinguishes the underlying cause of action. The exemption from suit accorded those
named in the statute is a substantive right .... "); Bruce, 894 S.W.2d at 276 ("Statutes of repose are
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"is engrafted onto a substantive right created by law."'  This distinction between
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose "correspond[s] to the distinction between
procedural and substantive law."' "Statutes of repose are meant to be 'a substan-
tive definition of rights as distinguished from procedural limitation on the remedy
used to enforce rights."'"'
The consequence of this substantive/procedural distinction between statutes of
repose and statutes of limitation is that because a statute of repose is substantive, it
relates to the jurisdiction of the court, and any "failure to commence the action within
the applicable time period extinguishes the right itself and divests the... court of
any subject matter jurisdiction which it might otherwise have."' If the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction after expiration of the period of repose, it also loses equity
jurisdiction.
Statutes of repose set the outside time limit after which a cause of action is
extinguished. Statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling principles, "9
because "to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative
body. ' ' 
°
substantive rather than procedural .... A statute of repose is a substantive provision because it expressly
qualifies the right which the statute creates by barring a right of action even before the injury occurred
if the injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period.").
225. Goad, 831 F.2d at 511.
226. IL
227. Il (quoting Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1982)).; but see
Shadbume-Vinton v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 60 F.3d 1071 (4th Cir. 1995). In Shadburne, the
court ruled that the substative/procedural distinction between statutes of repose and statute of limitation
is not controlling when determining whether retroactive application of an exception to a statute of repose
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court held that "recent developments in the
law require us to apply the rational basis test in determining whether retroactive legislation violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For purposes of constitutional analysis, the same test
applies regardless of whether the statute at issue is one of repose or one of limitation." Id. at 1077; see
also Wesley Theological Seminary v. United Statds Gypsum Co., 876 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In
Wesley, the court resolved the constitutional question "without classifying the District's statute as
substantive or procedural." The court ruled that the question for due process purposes is whether the
legislature acted in an artitrary and irrational way in retroactively applying an exception to a statute of
repose. Id. at 122.
228. Hinkle, 896 F. Supp. 190, 194 (C.D. 11. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 85 F.3d 298 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Botelho v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. (In re Botelho), 195 B.R. 558, 568 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996); Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ("Because a statute of repose is
substantive it relates to the jurisdiction of the court and any failure to commence the action within the
applicable time period extinguishes the right itself and divests the . . . court of any subject matter
jurisdiction which it might otherwise have.") (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Cronin
v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995).
229. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 ("A statute of repose represents
an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists and i§ not tolled for any reason because
to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the legislative body."); see also Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkin, Prupis & Petigroxy v. Gibertson, 501 U.S. 350, 358-61 (1991) (determining that section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not subject to equitable tolling); Christopher R. Leslie, Den of
Inequity. The Case for Equitable Doctrines in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1591 (1993)
("[A] statute of repose is a type of statute of limitation which is not subject to equitable principles.").
230. Amoco, 85 F.3d at 1472.
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Under the third definitional formulation identified by Professor McGovern, a
statute of repose is considered a species of statutes of limitation.' Under this
formulation, a statute of repose would be that "portion of a statute of limitation that
places a cap or outer limit on a statute that begins to run when a party discovers the
existence of an injury or a cause of action.""2 Because these statutes contain both
limitations and repose components, the terms "bifurcated" or "two-tier," have been
used to describe them." An example of a bifurcated statute is Georgia's medical
malpractice limitations provision. The statute has both a two-year statute of
limitations' and a five-year statute of repose, 5 both of which are found in the
same statutory sections of the Georgia Code. The statute specifically provides that
the legislature intended to create a bifurcated statute2 7
The fourth definition identified by Professor McGovern distinguishes between
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation on the basis of when each statute begins
to run.m Unlike a statute of limitations that begins running upon accrual of the
cause of action, a statute of repose may begin running at some time other than
accrual of the cause of action z9 A statute of repose may begin running much
231. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583; see also Leslie, supra note 229, at 1591 (considering
a statute of repose a type of statute of limitation, but distinguishing statutes of repose and statutes of
limitation on the basis that a statute of repose is not subject to equitable principles).
232. McGovern, supra note 211, at 583.
233. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 584. Professor McGovern states:
For example, a tort statute of limitation might run for two years, with an exception that
the statute would not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should discover, an injury. A statute of repose would be the
additional statutory language providing that in no event should a cause of action be
brought more than ten years after the elements of a cause of action have accrued.
Id.; see also Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing Illinois bifurcated
medical malpractice statute.).
234. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71(a) (1985) ("Except as otherwise provided in this article, an action
for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death
arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.").
235. See id. § 9-3-71(b) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, in no event may an
action for medical malpractice be brought more than five years after the date on which the negligent or
wrongful act or omission occurred.").
236. See Hanflik v. Ratchford, 848 F.Supp. 1539, 1542 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("Both the applicable
statute of limitation and statute of repose are codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71. Although this code section
is entitled "General limitation", subsection '(a)' contains the two year statute of limitation while
subsections '(b)' and '(c)' contain the five year statute of repose and abrogation.").
237. In relevant part, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71(c) provides: "Subsection (a) of this Code section is
intended to create a two-year statute of limitations. Subsection (b) of this Code section is intended to
create a five-year statute of ultimate repose and abrogation."
238. See McGover, supra note 211, at 584.
239. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 584; see also Hinds v. Kellogg, 776 F.Supp 1102, 1104
(E.D. Va. 1991) ("Thus, like Virginia's statute of repose .... Indiana's product liability statute of repose
is triggered by an event unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action - the date of delivery to the initial
user."); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995). In Cronin, the court stated:
Accordingly, where the one-year statute of limitations governs the time within which
legal proceedings may be commenced after the cause of action accrues, the three-year
medical malpractice statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be
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earlier than the time when the cause of action accrues.
It is conceivable, therefore, that with a statute of repose a plaintiffs right to sue
may terminate before her cause of action has accrued.' When, for example, a ten-
year statute of repose is compared with a two-year statute of limitations, the right to
enforce a cause of z.ction for injuries may be terminated under the ten-year statute
of repose before the two-year statute of limitations begins running on the same cause
of action. This would occur if, for example, the statute of repose begins running
from the date the "product is first placed into the stream of commerce. If injury
occurs in the eleventh year following introduction of the product into the stream of
commerce, the ten-year statute of repose would have already run. Therefore, the
plaintiff would have no cause of action against the defendant. In comparison, the
two-year statute of limitations would not begin running until the date of injury,
assuming that the cause of action accrues on the date of the injury. Thus, in the
absence of a statute of repose, plaintiff would have two years from that date to
enforce her cause of action against the defendant, thirteen years after the product was
first placed into commerce.
According to McGovern, "[a] fifth definition of 'statute of repose' has been found
in the 'useful safe life' provisions of product liability statutes."' Under these
provisions, the defendant is not liable if it proves that the product has been used
beyond its useful safe life. 2 Rather than being a definition of a statute of repose,
the "useful safe life" distinction is more another example of a statute of repose.
Therefore, the "useful safe life" distinction will not be discussed further in this
article.
Rather than choosing one formulation as the definitive statement of what
constitutes a statute of repose, it makes more analytical sense to consider each
formulation as one factor in distinguishing between statutes of limitation and statutes
of repose. Analysis of these factors demonstrates that section 522(l) is more in the
nature of a statute of repose.
1. Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitation Both Prescribe the Time Period
Within Which a Cause of Action May Be Brought
Section 522(1) establishes the mechanism through which a bankruptcy debtor
exempts property from property of the estate. The first step in this process involves
filing a list of property the debtor claims to be exempt property. 3 According to the
statute, "[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such
brought, but it is entirely unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action and can, in fact, bar
a cause of action before it has accrued.
Id. at 912.
240. See Cronin, 9C6 S.W.2d at 912.
241. McGovern, supra note 211, at 586.
242. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 586. The fifth definition is specific to products liability
actions and will not be discussed further in this article.
243. 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994), in relevant part provides: "The debtor shall file a list of property
the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section."
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list is exempt."' The statute does not prescribe when a party in interest must file
an objection in order to prevent the listed property from becoming exempt. The time
period is found in Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b), which provides:
The trustee or any creditor may file objections to the list of property
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of
creditors... or the filing of any amendment to the list or supplemental
schedules, within such period, further time is granted by the court. 5
Under the first definitional formulation identified by Professor McGovern, statutes
of repose and statutes of limitation "are [simply] legislative enactments that prescribe
the period within which a cause of action may be brought."' Nowhere does the
text of section 5220) provide a time period within which the trustee must object to
the debtor's list of exemptions. The lack of a limitations period in the text of section
522(1) leaves open the possibility that the legislature never intended the debtor's
exemption rights in exempt property to vest, since the statute provides no cut-off date
after which the trustee is precluded from objecting.
The absence of a limitations period in the text of section 522(1) is not fatal, since
Rule 4003(b) establishes the limitations period. Because the section 522(1) provides
that property claimed as exempt is exempt if no one objects, the text of section 522(1)
and Rule 4003(b) indicates that Congress did intend that the trustee's right to object
to the list of property claimed as exempt would terminate on a specified date. 7
After the limitations period under Rule 4003(b) has run, the trustee no longer has a
right to object to the status of the debtor's exempt property. "
The fact that the cut-off period for objecting to claimed exemptions is found in the
accompanying Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) does not preclude a determination that
section 522 is a statute of repose or a statute of limitation. However, a definition that
considers statutes of repose to be no different from statutes of limitation provides no
basis for or reason to distinguish between the two. In a broader conceptual sense,
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation are identical: they both establish a period
beyond which a cause of action may not be brought. One needs a more elucidating
test to identify the distinctions between the two types of statutes. This test does not
do the job.
244. Id.
245. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
246. McGovern, supra note 210, at 582.
247. The legislative history of section 522(l) provides: "Subsection (1) requires the debtor to file
a list of property that he claims as exempt form the property of the estate. Absent an objection to the
list, the property is exempted." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 363, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6319; see Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 423 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (stating that where the text of the statute is clear,
it "all but resolves this case, for the general rule of statutory interpretation is that where the 'terms of a
statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare circumstances.")).
248. See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644.
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Z Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitation Can Be Distinguished on the
Basis of the Policy Each Is Intended to Implement
Statutes of limitation "represent a public policy judgment by ... [legislatures] as
to the time at which an action becomes too stale to proceed in its courts.""A On the
other hand, statutes of repose promote the policy of finality, by "limiting [the]
time during which [a] cause of action can arise."'" Statutes of repose set an outside
limit after which, regardless of whether the cause of action has accrued, the cause of
action is extinguished.' Whether section 522(1) is a statute of repose or a statute
of limitation will turn on whether the policy advanced by section 522(1) and Rule
4003(b) correspond more closely to policies promoted by statutes of limitation or
repose.
The limitations period in Rule 4003(b) and the statutory framework of section
522(1) serves a policy function that is more consistent with the finality policy served
by statutes of repose than the policy of preventing stale claims which statutes of
limitation serve. Courts have identified divergent policies served by Rule 4003(b).
According to the Third Circuit in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,; "[t]he time limits
and obligations established by section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) serve the dual
purposes of finality and certainty."'  The need for finality and certainty in a
bankruptcy context "is especially acute."'  The Supreme Court, affirming the Third
Circuit's decision in Taylor, agreed that although "[d]eadlines may lead to unwel-
coined results .... they prompt parties to act and they produce finality."'  Other
courts, although not expressly identifying the finality policy, have described the
policy in similar terms an
249. Goad v. Celote,. Corp., 831 F.2d 508,510 (stating that "[s]tatutes of limitation... are primary
instruments of public policy and of court management ... .
250. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583.
251. Hinkle v. Hendcrson, 85 F.3d 298,301 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1411
(6th ed. 1990)).
252. See Amoco Prol. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
"[a] statute of repose represents an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer exists .....
253. 938 F.2d 420 (3rd Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 425.
255. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit:
This need is reflected by Bankruptcy Rule 9006, which states that '[i]n the interest of
prompt administration of bankruptcy cases certain time periods may not be extended .... '
Thus, where there is a date when parties' rights can be finally determined - in this case,
thirty days after the. creditors' meeting if no objection is filed - the parties can proceed from
that date knowing which property is property of the estate and which property belongs to the
debtor. The debtor from that day forward can treat exempted property as his or her own and
is not forced to wait until some unknown future date when the trustee or another party in
interest might haul the debtor into court seeking that property.
Id. at 425.
256. Taylor v. Freehd & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).
257. See In re Grossman, 80 B.R. 311, 315 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Thus, the deadline for
objections and the filing of exemptions where no objection is made serves the necessary purpose of
establishing a date on which the rights of various parties can be fixed.").
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Still other courts have opined that the time limits and obligations established by
section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) serve "to ensure timely notice to debtors that the
trustee objects to the claimed exemption.""8 Courts that focus on the notice policy
served by section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) have done so primarily in the context of
determining whether informal objections to the debtor's exemption claims are
approved by section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) 9 Although some courts have
suggested policy justifications for section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) in addition to the
policy of finality, the finality policy which these provisions serve earns section 522(1)
and Rule 4003(b) the statute of repose designation.
The time period for objecting to exemption claims is so short, thirty days following
the conclusion of the meeting of creditors, that it would be difficult to conclude that
section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) are designed to serve an evidentiary function. The
time period for objecting to the debtor's claims of exemption is so short that it is
unlikely that concerns regarding the lapse of memories, disappearance of witnesses,
or the loss of evidence would be at issue. Therefore, because section 522() and Rule
4003(b) advance a finality policy and not an evidentiary policy, under the policy-
based formulation, section 522(1) is a statute of repose.
3. Statutes of Repose Are Substantive Not Procedural in Nature as Are Statutes
of Limitation
Section 522() is a statute of repose and may be distinguished from a statute of
limitations on the basis that, unlike a statute of limitation, section 522(1) is a substan-
tive rather than a procedural provision. The limitations period of a statute of
limitation begins running, under the "discovery rule,"'z when plaintiffs injuries are
discoverable. Because the plaintiffs cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows
or should have known of his injuries under the discovery rule,"' a plaintiff may not
discover her injuries for many years after the injury actually occurred.' The length
of time between occurrence and discovery of plaintiffs injuries may be so long that
defendants may be unduly disadvantaged when forced to defend claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared.' It is this evidentiary inequity' statutes of
258. In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987); see also In re Stanley, 143 B.R. 900, 904
(Bankr. W.D. Md. 1992) (agreeing with Young that the purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to ensure timely
notice to the debtor that the trustee disputes the exemption claim).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 72-100.
260. See Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583; see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Doneldson, 325 U.S. 304
(1945). In Chase, the Supreme Court stated:
Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than
in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and
pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared,
and evidence has been lost.
Id. at 314; see also Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp. 294, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("The
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limitation were designed to prevent.n
Unlike a statute of limitations which serves to prevent prosecution of stale claims,
the limitations period of Rule 4003(b) is so short that it is unlikely that section 522(1)
and Rule 4003(b) were intended to protect debtors from the evidentiary inequities
defendants face when defending against stale claims. Rule 4003(b)'s limitations
period was intended to fix the rights to exempt property within a relatively short
period of time after commencement of the bankruptcy case.
A statute of limitation is "primarily [an] instrument of public policy and of court
management, and do[es] not confer upon defendants any right to be free from
liability . . . ."I It is merely "a procedural device that operates as a defense to
limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action."' 7 A statute of
limitation "extinguish[es], after [a] period of time, [the] right to prosecute [an]
accrued cause of action . . . ."' A statute of limitation achieves its function of
barring stale claims by preventing prosecution of an existing cause of action.
Statutes of limitation do not extinguish a cause of action, rather they prevent the
plaintiffs from taking any action to enforce their rights. Therefore, although a cause
of action may be unenforceable after the running of a statute of limitation, the cause
of action still continues to exist. Section 522(1) is a statute of repose because the
effect of the trustee's failure to object to the debtor's claim of exemption is to
extinguish the trustee's right to prevent vesting of the debtor's exemption right.
Potential liability is limited by statutes of repose "by limiting the time during which
a cause of action can arise."' After the running of a statute of repose, the cause
of action no longer exists. °  Statutes of repose are considered substantive
provisions z  because they "make the filing of suit within a specified time period
purpose of the statute of limitations, in the oft-quoted words of Justice Holmes is to '(prevent) surprise
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.").
264. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583.
265. See Rumberg, 424 F.Supp. at 298.
266. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 510.
267. First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th.Cir.
1989).
268. Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
269. d; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464, 1472 (10th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[a] statute of repose represents an absolute time limit beyond which liability no longer
exists .... ); Nesladek v. Ford Motor Company, 46 F.3d 734,737 (8th. Cir. 1995) ("A statute of repose,
on the other hand, directly impacts on the accrual of a cause of action in the first instance. It operates
as a statutory bar independent of the actions (or inaction) of the litigants - often before those litigants
can ever be identified.") (citation omitted).
270. See Amoco Prod Co., 85 F.3d at 1464.
271. See Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ("Statutes of repose are
substantive rather than procedural .... A statute of repose is a substantive provision because it expressly
qualifies the right which the statute creates by barring a right of action even before the injury occurred
if the injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period."); Delon Hampton & Assoc., Chartered v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 943 F.2d 355, 360-361 (4th. Cir. 1991) ("unlike a 'pure' statute
of limitation that merely bars the maintenance of a remedy, the statute of repose bars the remedy and
extinguishes the underlying cause of action. The exemption from suit accorded those named in the statute
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a substantive part of plaintiffs cause of action."'2 That is, unless the cause of
action is filed within the period specified by the statutes, the cause of action vanishes.
Section 522(l) creates a substantive right in the trustee to object to the property the
debtor claims as exempt. Section 522() makes filing the objection within the time
specified by Rule 4003(b) a substantive part of the trustees right to prevent property
claimed as exempt by the debtor from becoming exempt. According to the Supreme
Court in Taylor, the trustee's objection right is not subject to a condition that the
property qualify as exempt property."3 One characteristic of a statute of repose is
that "the time for filing suit is engrafted onto a substantive right created by law."2 4
Engrafted into the trustee's substantive right under section 522(1) to prevent property
claimed as exempt from becoming exempt property is the limitation that this right
must be exercised within thirty days following conclusion of the meeting of creditors.
If the right to object is not exercised within this period, the debtor's exemption rights
vest, the property claimed as exempt becomes exempt, the property claimed as
exempt is no longer property of the estate, and the trustee's rights to the property
never comes into existence. Since Rule 4003(b) measures the beginning of the
limitations period for objecting to the debtor's exemption claims from an event
unrelated to accrual of the trustee's cause of action, section 522(1) is a statute of
repose.
4. Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitation Are Distinguished on the Basis
of When the Statute Begins To Run 5
McGovern also distinguished between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation
on the basis of when each statute begins to run.276 Under this formulation, the
limitations period for a statute of limitation begins running upon accrual of the cause
of action, while the beginning of the limitations period for a statute of repose is
measured from an event unrelated to accrual of the cause of action.2 A products
is a substantive right ....'); Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Statutes of
repose are meant to be a substantive definition of rights as distinguished from a procedural limitation on
the remedy used to enforce rights.").
272. Goad, 831 F.2d at 511.
273. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992).
274. Goad, 831 F.2d at 511.
275. The third formulation for distinguishing between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation
identified by McGovern, that a "statute of repose" is a generic term that describes statutes of which a
statute of limitation is but a variety, simply recognizes that a single statute may contain differing
limitation provisions each of which serves its respective function. A statute of repose would be that
portion of the bifurcated statute that places a cap or outer limit on a statute that begins to run when the
cause of action accrues. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 583; see supra text accompanying notes 231-
37. Section 522(1) is not a bifurcated statute, containing both a repose portion and limitations provision.
This formulation will not be considered, since this definition is more a description of a type of statute
rather than a test for distinguishing between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose.
276. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 584.
277. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 584; see also Hinds v. Compair Kellogg, 776 F. Supp 1102,
1104 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("Thus, like Virginia's statute of repose.... Indiana's product liability statute of
repose is triggered by an event unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action - the date of delivery to
the initial user."); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995). In Cronin, the court stated:
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liability statute of repose, for example, might provide that any product liability action
must be commenced within ten years after the product was first sold or leased. A
statute of limitation, on the other hand, would require the cause of action be brought
within two years after the cause of action accrued.
Section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b) establish a specific outside time limit for objecting
to the debtor's claim of exemption. Like a products liability statute of repose, the
limitations period for objecting to the debtor's exemption claim begins following
occurrence of a specific event: the conclusion of the meeting of creditors. Unlike
statutes of limitation, Rule 4003(b) does not allow the trustee to object upon accrual
of the trustee's objection right, i.e, within thirty days following the date the trustee
knew or had reason to know that the debtor's exemption claim was invalidY
Section 522(I) is a statute of repose because, unlike a statute of limitation which
begins running upon accrual of the cause of action, the limitations period for filing
objections to debtors' claims of exemption begins running from a specified date: the
conclusion of the meating of creditors.'h WAile that date may also coincide with
the date the trustee learns reasons for objecting to the debtor's exemption claims, it
could be argued because the trustee's cause of action (the right to prevent vesting of
the debtor's exemption rights by timely objecting) accrues at the conclusion of the
meeting of creditors, section 522(1) is a statute of limitation.
However, the period for objecting to the debtor's exemption claims begins running
regardless of the level of the trustee's actual or constructive knowledge. The period
for objecting to the debtor's exemption claim is triggered by an event other than
accrual of the trustee's cause of action under section 522(1) and Rule 4003(b),
conclusion of the meeting of creditors.
Accrual of the trustee's right to object is not an element of the cause of action
under section 5220) and Rule 4003(b). These provisions establish a specific event,
upon occurrence of which the thirty-day limitations period begins to run. This is
exactly the manner in which the limitations period of a statute of repose begins
running. Because the time period under Rule 4003(b) begins running upon conclusion
of the meeting of creditors and not upon accrual of the substantive right to object
under section 5220), section 522(1) is a statute of repose.
Accordingly, whare the one-year statute of limitations governs the time within which
legal proceedings may be commenced after the cause of action accrues, the three-year
medical malpractice statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be
brought, but it is entirely unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action and can, in fact, bar
a cause of action bfore it has accrued.
Id. at 912.
278. See In re Keyworth, 47 B.R. 966, 969 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) ("Rule 4003(b) provides that
any objection may be filed within thirty (30) days after the conclusion of the § 341 meeting, not within
thirty (30) days of discovering facts forming a basis for the objection.").
279. The limitations period of a statute of limitation begins running when the cause of action
accrues, that is, when the plaintiff knows or should have known of her injuries. On the other hand, with
a statute of repose, the limitations period begins running at an arbitrary time determined by a legislature,
not by when injury occurs, or a cause of action accrues. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 276; see also
Stephen J. Werber, The Conzstitutional Dimension of a National Product Liability Statute of Repose, 40
VILL. L. REv. 985, 989 (1995).
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B. Application of Informal Objection Doctrines to a Statute of Repose, Section
522()
1. Merged Informal Objection Doctrine
Current informal objection theory evolved from merger of the surrogate objection
and the notice-based doctrines. The essential element of the surrogate objection
doctrine is the requirement that the trustee file a pleading, although not necessarily
a pleading denominated an "Objection to Debtor Exemption," within the limitations
period established by Rule 4003(b). The pleading must at least raise the issue of the
trustee's objection to the debtor's exemption claim. The notice-based doctrine is
premised on the notion that Rule 4003(b) established a notice procedure to alert
debtors that there may be controversy surrounding the property claimed as
exempt. ' Therefore, if the debtor receives notice, within the limitations period of
Rule 4003(b), that her exemption claim is disputed, the notice requirement of Rule
4003 is met.
Merger of the surrogate objection and notice-based doctrines resulted in a more
precise standard for determining whether pleadings qualify as a surrogate objection
and whether the objections adequately appraised the debtor of the dispute regarding
the exemptions claimed. To qualify as a surrogate objection under Rule 4003(b), the
objection must be filed. A document is filed under Rule 5005(a)' if it is filed with
clerk of the bankruptcy court in the district where the bankruptcy case is pending,'
with the judge,' or erroneously filed with specific officers of the court.' Under
this analysis, letters to the debtor would not qualify as a surrogate objection, nor
would taking possession of the property claimed as exempt.r The fact that the
statute to which the merged surrogate/notice-based objection theory is applied may
be considered a statute of repose does not matter. If the surrogate objection was filed
within the meaning of Rule 5005, if it was filed within the period prescribed by Rule
280. See In re Dembs, 757 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773, 777 (6th
Cir. 1985); In re Young, 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987) (trustee's motion requesting all future
annuity payments be turned over to the trustee was effective as an objection, but relying on notice based
analysis); In re Brawn, 138 B.R. 327, 333 n.29 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) ("Plaintiffs response to Hayward's
§ 522(0 motion qualifies, in and of itself, as the 'objection' Rule 4003(b) requires.").
281. See Young, 806 F.2d at 1305 ("The basic purpose of the thirty day requirement in Rule 4003(b)
is to ensure timely notice to debtors that the trustee objects to their claimed exemptions."); see also In
re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1392 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit "that the primary
purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to ensure timely notice of the trustee's objection to a claimed exemption.");
In re Owen, 74 B.R. 697, 698 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) ("[T]he Court believes the Trustee has complied
with the basic purpose of the thirty day requirement of Rule 4003(b), which is to ensure timely notice
to debtors that the trustee objects to their claimed exemptions."); In re Stanley, 143 B.R. 900, 904
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
282. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(a).
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(c).
286. See Peterson, 920 F.2d at 1389.
287. See In re Canino, 185 B.R. 584 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
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4003(b), and if it adequately apprised the debtor of the dispute concerning her
exemption claim, the objection would be timely.
2. Relation Back Doctrine
One distinguishing factor between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation is
that upon expiration of the limitations period of a statute of repose the cause of
action is extinguished, while the cause of action is only unenforceable after expiration
of a statute of limitation. Application of the relation back doctrine to each of these
statutes raises a fundamental question. If the cause of action is extinguished after
running of the statute of repose, will an amended pleading - filed after expiration
of the limitations period - relate back to the date of the original pleading,
particularly since the cause of action no longer exists? Courts have differed on
whether Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine is applicable to statutes of repose. Some
courts hold a statute cf repose prevents relation back after expiration of the repose
period,' while other courts reach the opposite conclusion.
Courts refusing to apply the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c) to statutes of
repose direct their analysis to the substantive/procedural distinction between statutes
of repose and statutes of limitation. A statute of repose defines a substantive right
which is extinguished after running of the limitations period. Therefore, these courts
conclude, because rights under a statute of repose are extinguished after expiration
of the limitations period, application of the relation back doctrine "would have the
effect of reactivating a cause of action that the Legislature obviously intended to
eliminate."' The idea is that, once rights under a statute of repose are extinguished,
there is no cause of action to which an amended complaint can relate back.
Courts that have applied the Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine to statutes of
repose are not deterred by the notion that upon the running of a statute of repose, the
cause of action is extinguished under the substantive/procedural distinction. These
courts reason that "[t]his distinction primarily affects the application of various
equitable tolling doctrines .... which delay the running of statutes of limitations." ''
Therefore, a plaintiff may not employ equitable tolling if the statute is one of repose
rather than a statute of limitation.' Since Rule 15(c) does not apply tolling
288. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Olson, 768 F. Supp 283, 285 (D. Ariz. 1991) ("Relation back
under Rule 15 does not apply when the statute at issue defines substantive rights rather than merely
limiting procedural remedics."); Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Kohlhase, 897 P.2d 738, 741 n.2 (Ariz,
Ct. App. 1995) (agreeing Aith Olson); Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Amperif Corp., 840 F.Supp 1068, 1072
n.5 (D. Md. 1993) (citing Olson with approval); Tindol v. Boston Housing Auth., 487 N.E.2d 488, 491
(Mass. 1986) (holding Rule 15(c) not applicable to statute of repose); Ferrera & Sons v. Samuels, 486
N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 1985).
289. See Boesky Sec. Litig. v. Wickes Cos., 882 F.Supp 1371, 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting
notion that Rule 15(c) is a tolling doctrine which cannot be applied to statutes of repose.); Neuner v.
C.G. Reality Capital Ventures-I (In re Sharp Run Assoc.), 157 B.R. 766,783 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) ("We
do not agree that § 46(a) is a statute of repose, nor do we agree that statutes of repose automatically bar
relation back.").
290. Ferrera & Sons, 486 N.E.2d at 60; see also Tindol, 487 N.E. at 490 (agreeing with Ferrera).
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principles, 3 the fact that the statute to which the rule is being applied is a statute
of repose is no bar to application of its relation back doctrine.' "
The question of whether Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine may be applied to
statutes of repose may be resolved on policy grounds. Statutes of repose serve one
relevant policy goal above and beyond those served by statutes of limitations: "to
give defendants greater certainty and predictability."2" Application of Rule 15(c)
to statutes of repose and to section 5221) would not impair this policy goal.
Equitable tolling principles may not be employed if the statute is a statute of
repose, because equitable tolling would operate to prevent running of the repose
period. The operative effect of tolling is to give a party additional time to initiate an
original cause of action. Extending the repose period for an unknown time period to
enable a plaintiff, or in this case the bankruptcy trustee, to initiate an original cause
of action would be in direct contravention of the principal policy goal of statutes of
repose, which is "to give defendants greater certainty and predictability."'2
Rule 15(c), however, does not provide a party additional time within which to
initiate the party's original cause of action or to initiate an action that is unrelated to
the original action. The basis for application of Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine
is that the cause of action has already been filed and the party amending her pleading
is allowed to better delineate the contours of the original suit. The doctrine does not
allow a party to raise a new cause of action which did not arise out of the same
conduct or transaction that was the basis for the original suit. Application of Rule
15(c) would not impair the policies of certainty and predictability advanced by a
statute of repose.
Where the bankruptcy trustee files a formal or informal objection within the repose
period prescribed by Rule 4003(b), filing vests the trustee's objection right. If the
trustee filed the original objection within the repose period and the original objection
apprised the debtor of the dispute surrounding her exemption claim, the trustee may
later amend the original objection. However, the trustee will not be allowed to amend
the original objection if the trustee's initial formal or informal objection was filed
after expiration of the repose period of Rule 4003(b).
293. See Boesky Sec. Litig., 882 F. Supp at 1381. The Boesky court stated:
Rule 15(c) is not a tolling doctrine. Tolling doctrines stop the statute of limitations
from running even if the accrual date has passed .... However, the effect of Rule 15(c)
is not to suspend the running of a statute of limitations; instead, it allows a litigant to sue
upon a claim on which the statute of limitation has already run out and that would be
barred were it to be brought in a separate action .... Therefore, Lampfs holding that
tolling principles do not apply to the three year statute of repose applicable to 10(b)
claims does not mean that Rule 15(c) cannot allow a § 10(b) claim to be added by
amendment to a timely-filed complaint, even though the amendment is proposed... more
than three years after the § 10(b) violation.
Id. (citations omitted).
294. According to the court in Sharps Run Assoc., the only circumstance under which application
of Rule 15(c) would be prohibited is "[w~here relating back a new pleading would truly disturb the
'repose' of the limiting statue .... " Sharps Run Assoc., 157 B.R. at 784.
295. Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1996).
296. Id.
1997]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
IV. Conclusion
Only three of the five definitional formulations identified by McGovern' for
distinguishing between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose are relevant in
determining whether section 522(1) is a statute of repose. Application of these
formulations support the conclusion that section 522(1) is a statute of repose.
Considering section 522(1) a statute of repose is consistent with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Taylor that the time deadlines are to be strictly construed. The conclusion
that section 522(1) is a statute of repose does not radically affect the bankruptcy
court's authority to employ informal objection and relation back doctrines in rescuing
the trustee who fails to timely object to the debtor's claims of exemption.
Current informal objection doctrine is the result of a merger of the surrogate
objection and notice-based doctrines. The merger of these doctrines establishes a
precise standard for determining whether pleadings qualify as a surrogate objection
and whether they adequately apprise the debtor of the trustee's dispute regarding the
property the debtor claims is exempt. To qualify as a surrogate objection under Rule
4003(b), the objection must be filed. A document is filed under Rule 5005(a)298 if
it is filed with clerk of the bankruptcy court in the district where the bankruptcy case
is pending, filed with the judge,"w or erroneously filed with specific officers of
the court. 0 Under this analysis, letters to the debtor would not qualify as a
surrogate objection,' nor would taking possession of the property claimed as
exempt.a
Application of the merged surrogate/notice-based objection theory is not affected
by whether the statute under consideration is a statute of repose or a statute of
limitation. If an informal objection is filed before expiration of the limitations period
of Rule 4003(b), the objection is timely regardless or whether section 522(1) is
considered a statute of repose. If the surrogate objection is filed within the meaning
of Rule 5005, if it is filed within the limitations period of Rule 4003(b), and it
adequately apprises the debtor of the dispute concerning her exemption claim, the
objection would be timely regardless of whether the statute is a statute of repose.
Under the first definitional formulation for distinguishing between statutes of
repose and statutes of limitation, these statutes may be distinguished on the basis of
the policy each serves. Statutes of repose serve one relevant policy goal above and
beyond those served by statutes of limitations: "to give defendants greater certainty
and predictability."' These policy goals are identical to the policy goal of certainty
and finality advanced by section 522(1). These policy goals are not impaired because
297. See supra text accompanying notes 210-94.
298. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(a).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005(c).
302. See In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389, 1389 (8th Cir. 1990).
303. See In re Canino, 185 B.R. 584, 589 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).
304. Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Rule 4003(b) is applied to allow relation back of a formal objection to an informal
objection that was filed before expiration of the repose period of Rule 4003(b).
Application of the relation back doctrine allows an amended objection to relate
back to the trustee's timely informal or formal objection to the debtor's exemption
claims. The trustee's timely objection, if it satisfies Rule 15(c), will apprise the
debtor of the pending court proceeding. When the bankruptcy trustee timely files an
objection to the debtor's exemption claim, whether the objection is considered a
formal or informal objection, the trustee's right to prevent property the debtor claims
as exempt from becoming exempt vests. It is this vesting of the trustee's right upon
timely filing of her objection to the debtor's exemption claim that satisfies the
policies of certainty and predictability.
Once the trustee's right vests as to the specific property the debtor claimed was
exempt, the trustee may amend the objection so long as the amendment does not
raise an objection to property that was not objected to in the original objection.
Raising an objection to property claimed as exempt for the first time in the amended
objection prevents relation back to the original timely filed informal or formal
objection. Because Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine prevents relation back of an
objection to property the debtor claims as exempt if the first time the objection is
raised is in the amendment filed after expiration of the repose period, the policy goal
of certainty and predictability are preserved.
Under the substantive/procedural analysis, the second definitional formulation,
section 522(1) is considered a statute of repose because it is a substantive rights
provision rather than -procedural. Statutes of repose are considered substantive
provisions because initiating the cause within the repose period is a substantive part
of the cause of action created under the statute. The repose period defines the period
within which the cause of action can arise °5 Therefore, unless the cause of action
is initiated within the repose period, the cause of action is extinguished.
A statute of limitation, on the other hand, is "primarily [an] instrument[] of public
policy and of court management, and do[es] not confer upon defendants any right to
be free from liability . . . ."' It is merely "a procedural device that operates as a
defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action."' A cause
of action in not extinguished upon running of a statute of limitation; rather the cause
of action is unenforceable.
Under section 522(1) the trustee has a substantive right to object to the property the
debtor claims is exempt. Therefore, filing the objection within the time specified by
Rule 4003(b) is a substantive part of the trustee's right to prevent property of the
305. See Hinde, 85 F.3d at 301; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Newton Sheep Co., 85 F.3d 1464,
1472 (10th Cir. 1996) ("A statute of repose presents an absolute time limit beyond which liability no
longer exists ...."); Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 734, 737 (8th. Cir. 1995) ("A statute of
repose, on the other hand, directly impacts on the accrual of a cause of action in the first instance. It
operates as a statutory bar independent of the actions (or inaction) of the litigants - often before those
litigants can ever be identified.") (citation omitted).
306. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 510 (4th Cir. 1987).
307. First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir.
1989).
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debtor from becoming exempt. If the right to object is not exercised within the
repose period of Rule 4003(b), the debtor's exemption rights vest, the property
claimed as exempt becomes exempt, the property claimed as exempt is no longer
property of the estate, and the trustee's rights to the property never come into
existence.
Finally, under the third definitional formulation, section 522(1) is a statute of
repose since Rule 4(03(b) measures the beginning of the repose period from the
conclusion of the meeting of creditors. Unlike the case of a statute of limitation
where accrual of the cause of action triggers the running of the limitations period, the
meeting of creditors, an event other than accrual of the trustee's right to object,
measures the beginning of the repose period under Rule 4003(b).
Under this formulation, statutes of limitation and statutes of repose may be
distinguished on the basis of the event which triggers the starting date for measuring
the thirty-day limitations period. A statute of repose begins running from a defined
event, rather than when the cause of action accrues. The thirty-day limitations period
associated with section 522(1) begins running upon conclusion of the meeting of
creditors, rather than when the trustee's right to object to the debtor's exemption
claims accrues, supporting the proposition that section 522(l) is a statute of repose.
These distinguishing features, policy considerations, substantive rights considerations,
and what triggers the running of the limitations period, all support the conclusion that
section 522(1) is a statute of repose.
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